From the 2026 budget audit
192 milliárd Ft at executive discretion, outside parliament's sight.
The extraordinary government measures reserve funds executive-discretion spending outside normal parliamentary appropriation — weakening the budget as a check on the executive.
Roughly 48,000 Ft per taxpayer per year — 192 milliárd Ft available for executive discretion, without itemised parliamentary authorisation.
What you see — and what you don't
The seen: interventions the executive declares extraordinary, named after the fact if at all. The unseen: the parliamentary scrutiny function that a properly appropriated budget would provide, and every taxpayer's ability to know in advance what their money is authorised for.
Objection
"Genuine emergencies require a rapid-response reserve — you cannot pre-authorise every crisis through parliament."
Answer
A genuine emergency reserve is defensible and should exist. A 192 milliárd Ft pool spent at executive discretion without item-by-item reporting to parliament is not an emergency fund — it is an appropriation bypass. Freeze at current nominal levels; require post-hoc item-by-item reporting to parliament on all disbursements.
Share if you think emergency reserves should require parliament to see exactly where the money went.
The analyst's verdict
Extraordinary government measures (discretionary reserve)
Rationale
The Rendkívüli kormányzati intézkedések (extraordinary government measures, 191,999.0 millió Ft) is a reserve spent at executive discretion outside the normal appropriation process. From a public-choice standpoint a large discretionary-intervention pool weakens the budget's function as a parliamentary check on the executive — it is appropriation without the appropriation. It cannot be zeroed (genuine emergencies need a response), but it should not grow; Nominal Freeze, with the recommendation that its use be reported to parliament item by item.
Transition mechanism
Nominal Freeze — hold at 191,999.0 millió Ft in nominal terms. No indexation to inflation. Recommendation that its use be reported to parliament item by item.
Affected groups
Recipients of executive-discretion interventions funded from this reserve (undetermined by construction); parliament (whose appropriation function is weakened by a large undirected reserve); taxpayers, who cannot scrutinise how the reserve is spent.
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