From the 2026 budget audit
State companies paid 500 million for inclusion work — without a competitive tender.
A recurring transfer to state-linked commercial companies for social-inclusion tasks, with no market test of whether the work is done efficiently or is even needed at the stated cost.
About 125 Ft per taxpayer per year — 500 million Ft total — to state-linked companies providing inclusion services without competitive procurement.
What you see — and what you don't
The seen: state-linked companies with a guaranteed income for social-inclusion work. The unseen: the civil-society organisations and competitive providers who might deliver the same inclusion tasks more effectively — and who cannot compete with a connected company receiving a direct transfer.
Objection
"Social-inclusion work needs stable funding — competitive tendering introduces uncertainty that harms continuity."
Answer
Long-term contracts satisfy continuity; tendering for them introduces price discipline without removing stability. A recurring block transfer to a connected company, without a market test, is a soft budget constraint — costs are underwritten by taxpayers regardless of efficiency. Three years replaces the transfer with competitive procurement of the specified tasks.
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The analyst's verdict
Support for inclusion tasks performed by commercial companies
Rationale
The same soft-budget-constraint mechanism as the Gazdasági társaságok line above: a recurring transfer to a state-linked company rather than competitive procurement of a specified task.
Transition mechanism
Three-year phase-out (about 167 millió Ft per year), replacing the transfer with open tender.
Affected groups
The state-linked company and its employees carrying out inclusion tasks; the company may re-win the work on competitive terms.
Free Society Institute
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