Phase-Out

From the 2026 budget audit

Who decides which Hungarian minority organisations deserve to exist?

35.6 billion Ft in case-by-case grants, allocated not through published criteria but by a committee of political officeholders — 24 times the size of the Fund's own competitive-tender channel.

Roughly 7,900 Ft per employed Hungarian per year — for grants no citizen individually authorised and no household can revise.

36 bn HUF allocation 7,902 HUF / taxpayer / year 7 bn HUF Year-1 saving

What you see — and what you don't

The seen: the funded Hungarian-language school, church, or cultural association abroad. The unseen: the organisations equally committed to Hungarian minority life that receive nothing because they diverge from the committee's priorities — a divergence that never needs to be stated, because the grant is discretionary by design.

Objection

"But these grants sustain real Hungarian minority schools and churches in Romania and Slovakia — cutting them would harm the communities they serve."

Answer

The five-year phase-out does not close those institutions. It moves the financing from a political committee's discretion to the voluntary support of diaspora donors, the cross-border Hungarian business community, and the congregations those institutions already serve. The Hungarian church-school sector inside Hungary operates durably on exactly that mixed voluntary base. What ends is one political body's power to decide which minority organisations are sustained and which are not.

Share if you think minority communities are better served by voluntary donors than by a committee in Budapest.

The analyst's verdict

Individual grants to institutions of national significance and other organisations

Rationale

This is the largest single line in the chapter — 45% of the envelope — and it is the line where the mechanism is most exposed. "Egyedi támogatás" means exactly what the Hungarian says: individual, case-by-case grants, not awarded through a published tender with ex-ante criteria but allocated by decision of the Fund's Committee to named recipient organisations. The statute itself sets up two distinct channels — public tender ("pályázati eljárás") and individual grant — and the budget shows the individual-grant channel running at roughly 24 times the size of the tender channel (35,559.8 against 1,507.5 millió Ft). The bulk of the chapter does not pass through a competitive, criteria-based process. This is the structure in which subjective allocation by political officeholders becomes the operative mechanism. A committee chaired by the minister responsible for national policy decides which organisations among the Hungarian minority and diaspora institutional landscape are "of national significance" and how much each receives. There is no market price for minority cultural advocacy, no revealed willingness-to-pay that could discipline the allocation, and — because the recipients' budgets depend on the grant rather than on the constituencies they serve — the recipient organisations have a structural incentive to shape their activity toward the priorities of whichever administration controls the Committee. The seen is the funded Hungarian-language institution abroad. The unseen is the filtering effect: minority organisations whose programme aligns with the funding administration's view of nemzetpolitika are sustained; those that diverge are not, and the divergence need never be stated because the grant is discretionary by design. Phase-Out rather than Immediate Cut because the protected parties are real. A significant number of Hungarian-minority schools, churches, cultural associations, and media outlets in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine have built multi-year operating plans around this funding stream; abrupt removal would close functioning institutions serving communities with no domestic Hungarian-language alternative. The honest path is a five-year glide that lets recipient organisations rebuild toward voluntary financing — diaspora giving, the substantial cross-border Hungarian business community, congregational and membership support, and tuition where the recipient is a school. The Hungarian church-school sector inside Hungary itself demonstrates that community institutions sustaining a national curriculum can operate on a mixed base of per-pupil funding plus church and parental contributions rather than on discretionary central grant. The reform does not abandon the Hungarian minority; it removes the political officeholder from the position of deciding which minority institutions deserve to exist.

Transition mechanism

Linear reduction over five years (7,112.0 millió Ft restored to general revenue per year). In year one, the Fund publishes the full list of current individual-grant recipients and amounts — itself an accountability gain, since case-by-case grants are not currently subject to the transparency a published tender carries. Recipient organisations receive declining transitional grant on a fixed, pre-announced schedule, with the remaining four years used to develop voluntary funding bases. Capital commitments already contracted (the 3,387.8 millió Ft capital component) run off against their existing contracts rather than being cut mid-project.

Affected groups

Hungarian-minority institutions in the neighbouring states and the diaspora — schools, churches, cultural and media organisations — that currently receive individual grants. The transition cost is borne by these organisations and the communities they serve; the five-year horizon is set by the realistic time needed to rebuild a voluntary funding base, not by political convenience.

Sources

Free Society Institute

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