70 billion forints of training that doesn't track what employers actually need.

Rationale

This line subsidises vocational training — courses, training providers, and training-linked employer support. The difficulty is structural: the Fund administrator cannot know which skills are scarce in which local labour market, because that information exists only in the wage offers of employers who would hire the skill.[^7] A central training budget allocates toward the courses providers are set up to deliver and the ones administrators can credential, not necessarily toward the skills an employer would pay a premium for. The programme's own labour-market evaluations found that participants who did move from public works to the open market did so because labour demand rose, not because the training equipped them with what the market wanted[^2] — direct evidence that the training content is not tracking the price signal. This does not mean vocational training has no value. It means the state's role should not be to run and fund the training programme centrally. The protected parties are training providers on multi-year agreements and the cohorts of trainees currently enrolled, whose courses must be allowed to finish. A four-year phase-out lets in-flight course commitments run their term while intake is wound down. The envelope is better redirected — where a subsidy is retained at all — to demand-side instruments: a training voucher the worker takes to a provider of their choice, or an employer-side credit for training the employer has identified as needed. Both keep the choice of skill with the party who faces the actual labour-market price, rather than with the administrator who does not. The classification reflects the mechanism — central allocation of a budget that cannot price its output — not the size of the line.