A 2026-os költségvetés-elemzésből
7.3 milliárd Ft to run a grant programme that picks winners the market would not.
The operating cost of a system that channels capital to selected energy companies — giving chosen firms an advantage their unsubsidised competitors must absorb.
Roughly 1,840 Ft per taxpayer per year — 7,343 millió Ft just to administer the grant selection that directs 52 milliárd Ft of capital to chosen firms.
Amit látsz — és amit nem
The seen: the energy company that receives a modernisation grant and invests. The unseen: the competing firm that did not receive a grant and must recover its full capital cost from its own revenue — and the worker whose payroll tax funded the competitor's advantage.
Ellenvetés
"Energy modernisation requires public support — the market alone won't fund the transition fast enough."
Válasz
The market's judgement of which energy investment is worthwhile is exactly the information the grant programme replaces with a ministry's judgement. A subsidised firm can undercut a rival not because it is more efficient but because part of its balance sheet was covered by tax. The operating costs of administering that process are cut alongside the grants themselves.
Share if you think public money should not fund the bureaucracy that picks energy-sector winners.
Az elemző értékelése
Energia- és klímapolitikai modernizációs rendszer — Gazdálkodó és egyéb szervezetek támogatási programjai — működési
Az elemző indoklása jelenleg angol nyelven elérhető; magyar fordítás folyamatban.
Indoklás
This is the largest single discretionary item in the chapter after the two centrally-managed funds, and it is a direct transfer of capital to selected firms. The seen is the recipient enterprise: a named company receives a grant toward an energy-modernisation investment, and the investment proceeds. The unseen is everything that grant displaced. The 59.3 milliárd Ft does not appear from nowhere; it is collected from taxpayers — disproportionately working-age earners through the payroll and consumption wedge — and the firms that did not receive a grant face a competitor whose capital cost was partly socialised. A subsidised firm can underprice an unsubsidised rival not because it is more productive but because the state covered part of its balance sheet. Capital that would have flowed, through ordinary saving and lending, to whichever energy investment the market judged most valuable is instead directed to whichever applicant the ministry judged most deserving — and the ministry has no price signal telling it which investment yields the most. There is no contractual reliance interest that survives scrutiny here — grant applicants are not parties the state owes a phased exit; a grant not yet disbursed creates no enforceable claim. Immediate Cut.
Átállási mechanizmus
Eliminate in the 2026 cycle. No phased exit is required — grant applicants are not parties the state owes a phased exit; a grant not yet disbursed creates no enforceable claim.
Érintett csoportok
Firms that have applied for or received grants; competitor firms that did not receive a grant; taxpayers, disproportionately working-age earners through the payroll and consumption wedge.
Szabad Társadalom Intézet
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