From the 2026 budget audit
757 million Ft for state-approved training — awarded by an office that cannot tell which skills are actually worth acquiring.
A discretionary ministry training subsidy selects which training qualifies and who receives support, without a market price to discipline those choices.
Roughly 190 Ft per taxpayer per year — 757 million Ft routed through a ministry that decides which training is valuable.
What you see — and what you don't
The seen: firms and individuals receiving training support. The unseen: the training that is genuinely productive but fails the ministry's criteria — and the training designed to fit the subsidy rules rather than actual skills needs.
Objection
"Companies, especially small ones, can't afford to train workers without support."
Answer
Training that raises worker productivity returns value to the employer; training that raises the worker's skills returns value to the worker. Both parties have a direct incentive to fund it from those returns. A state subsidy does not reveal which training is worth doing — it replaces that signal with a ministry's judgement and creates an incentive to write training plans around the criteria, not the need.
Share if you think training decisions should be made by employers and workers, not by a ministry.
The analyst's verdict
Training Subsidy
Rationale
This line funds a training subsidy administered through the ministry's portfolio. A state-financed training subsidy to selected firms or individuals is a discretionary transfer: the awarding authority decides which training activities qualify and which applicants receive support, without a market price to discipline those decisions. Where training has value to the employer, the employer has a direct incentive to fund it — training that raises worker productivity generates returns the employer captures; where training has value to the worker, the worker likewise has an incentive to invest in it from future earnings. A state subsidy layered on top does not resolve the question of which training is worth funding; it creates an incentive to design activities to match the subsidy criteria rather than to respond to actual skills needs. The amount is modest but the structural problem is identical to the larger discretionary-transfer lines in this chapter. There is no contractual reliance interest justifying a phase-out: a discretionary annual appropriation creates no entitlement to continuation. The line can be closed in a single budget cycle.
Transition mechanism
Eliminate the appropriation in the 2026 cycle. Firms and workers fund training in proportion to the return they expect from it; the private incentive to invest in genuinely productive skills remains.
Affected groups
Firms and individuals holding pending training-support applications; no displacement.
Free Society Institute
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