The state buys land with one hand and sells it with the other.

In the same 2026 budget, the state plans to spend 2 billion Ft buying farmland while raising 14 billion Ft selling it — a self-contradicting position in a market that has thousands of private buyers and sellers.

2,000 millió Ft of capital spending — roughly 500 Ft per taxpayer — to buy farmland in a market where private farmers stand ready to buy it without state intermediation.

2 bn HUF allocation 444 HUF / taxpayer / year 2 bn HUF Year-1 saving

What you see — and what you don't

The seen: whoever sells a parcel to the state at a price no competitive discipline forced the state to justify. The unseen: the private farmers who would otherwise have bought and worked those parcels, and the taxpayers who fund the state's position in a market it has no business trading in.

Objection

"But the state needs to acquire land to consolidate fragmented rural title and support small farmers."

Answer

Land-consolidation commitments already contractually in train can be ring-fenced and phased out with the consolidation schedule — the analysis allows for that narrow carve-out. The discretionary remainder is different: buying farmland in a functioning market with thousands of private participants is a political-officeholder allocation decision made without the loss-discipline a private buyer faces. Nobody has a reliance interest in the state's future purchases; the 2,000 millió Ft can be cut in a single budget cycle.

Share if you think the state should stop buying farmland in a market that works fine without it.

The analyst's verdict

Agricultural Land Purchase

Rationale

This is the state spending 2,000.0 millió Ft to *buy* farmland in 2026. The framework's first question is whether the function could be financed voluntarily — and here the question answers itself in an unusually direct way, because the chapter's own tables show the state simultaneously *selling* farmland for 14,000.0 millió Ft (the Ingatlan értékesítése revenue line). The state is, on the same budget page, planning to be both a buyer and a seller of the same asset class. A private portfolio manager who bought and sold the identical commodity in the same year would be asked what information advantage justified the transaction costs. The state has no such advantage: farmland has thousands of private participants and a functioning price, and the parcels the state would buy are parcels private farmers would otherwise buy and work. Discretionary state acquisition of farmland is not a rights-protection function and not a constitutional precondition. It is a political-officeholder allocation decision — *which* parcels, from *whom*, at *what* price — made without the discipline a private buyer faces, because the buyer is not spending its own capital and bears no loss if the parcel is overpaid for or underused. New Zealand's 1984 reform programme removed the state from agricultural allocation wholesale — subsidies ended, the sector restructured, and Hungarian-relevant outcome: the primary sector subsequently competed and exported without the state as intermediary, with broad productivity gains concentrated in agriculture. The lesson is not that farmland is unimportant — it is that the price system, not a state purchasing desk, is the instrument that allocates it to its most productive use. The 2,000.0 millió Ft is felhalmozási (capital) spending with no contractual counterparty to protect — nobody has a reliance interest in the state's *future* purchases. It can be cut in a single budget cycle. Doing so does not shrink the supply of farmland by a hectare; it leaves those 2,000 millió Ft of parcels to be bought, at the market price, by farmers who will work them, and returns 2,000.0 millió Ft to the taxpayers who would otherwise have funded the state's position in a market it has no business trading in. One narrow caveat for the transition path: a residual acquisition capacity may be defensible where land purchase is the mechanism for completing the osztatlan közös tulajdon (undivided common ownership) consolidation — the long-running effort to rationalise fragmented rural title — or for honouring birtokrendezési (land-consolidation) commitments already in train. If, on examination of the NFK successor's programme documents, a portion of this line is found to be contractually committed to such a process, that portion phases out with the consolidation timetable rather than being cut immediately. The default classification on the discretionary remainder is Immediate Cut.

Transition mechanism

Remove the discretionary land-acquisition allocation from the 2026 budget. Examine the NFK successor's land-consolidation programme documents; ring-fence only the portion (if any) contractually committed to in-train osztatlan közös tulajdon settlement and phase that with the consolidation schedule.

Affected groups

None with a reliance interest. The "loser" is the state's own balance-sheet position as a farmland accumulator; the gainers are private farmers who buy the parcels and the taxpayers who keep the 2,000.0 millió Ft.

Sources

Free Society Institute

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