Phase-Out

From the 2026 budget audit

42 billion Ft for village roads — through a discretionary grant tournament.

42 billion Ft reaches small settlements through a discretionary central grant scheme where officeholders choose which village gets what, not a transparent per-capita formula.

Roughly 10,500 Ft per taxpayer per year — 42 billion Ft total — routed through a discretionary central programme rather than a rules-based, formula-driven settlement allocation.

42 bn HUF allocation 9,333 HUF / taxpayer / year 11 bn HUF Year-1 saving

What you see — and what you don't

The seen: village roads, rural infrastructure, and civil grants delivered to settlements with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. The unseen: the structural dependency created — settlements competing in an application cycle where a central office decides who gets the road this year, with no formula or rule to hold the allocator accountable.

Objection

"Without the Hungarian Village Programme, small settlements will not get the infrastructure they need — the state is the only funder willing to reach them."

Answer

The phase-out is of the discretionary central channel, not of rural roads. Infrastructure financing migrates to a transparent formula-based allocation under settlement control — no more application tournament. The civil-grant sub-line is not replaced. In-flight approved projects run to completion within the four-year horizon.

Share if you think village road funding should follow a formula, not a ministry's application cycle.

The analyst's verdict

Hungarian Village Programme (Rural Road Fund, small-settlement support, civil and other support)

Rationale

The Magyar Falu Program (Hungarian Village Programme) channels development funding to settlements with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants — local infrastructure, rural roads, small shops, civil organisations. At 42.0 milliárd Ft across the three sub-lines it is, taken together, the second-largest discretionary block in the chapter after priority sectoral support. The classification has to separate two things the programme bundles. Rural local infrastructure — village roads, basic municipal facilities — is a legitimate object of public expenditure; the question the framework presses is not whether small settlements should have functioning roads but *through what channel* they are financed. Routing settlement infrastructure through a centrally-administered, discretionary, application-and-award programme run from the ministry concentrates the allocation decision in central officeholders, who choose which settlements receive which awards. That is a subjective allocation: a central body, without a market price or a rules-based formula, deciding which village gets the road this year. It also creates a structural dependency of settlement administrations on the centre and on the application cycle. The classical-liberal direction is to move local-infrastructure financing onto a transparent, rules-based, per-capita or formula footing under the control of the settlements themselves and their own (locally-raised and formula-shared) revenue — the subsidiarity principle — rather than a discretionary central grant tournament. The "civil and other support" sub-line (6,700.0 millió Ft) is the weakest of the three: discretionary grants to civil organisations selected centrally, the same subjective-allocation pattern as the "other organisations" line above. Phase out the centrally-administered programme over four years. The horizon honours the in-flight, part-completed road and infrastructure projects already approved under the programme — those run to completion — while the financing of rural local infrastructure is migrated onto a rules-based, formula-driven local-revenue footing. The phase-out is of the discretionary central channel, not of rural roads.

Transition mechanism

Linear phase-out over 4 years of the centrally-administered programme. In-flight approved projects run to completion within the horizon. Rural local-infrastructure financing migrates to a transparent formula-based allocation under settlement control; the discretionary civil-grant sub-line is not replaced.

Affected groups

Small settlements, which gain a rules-based and predictable infrastructure-financing channel in place of a discretionary application cycle; settlement administrations dependent on the current programme; civil organisations receiving discretionary central grants, who fund their activity from member and local support thereafter. In-flight project counterparties are protected by the run-off horizon.

Sources

Free Society Institute

Support independent analysis

Our research is free, open, and unsponsored. If you find it valuable, help us keep it that way.