Phase-Out

From the 2026 budget audit

Why does a minister fund the institute that advises his own legislation?

A state comparative-law institute, supervised by the minister whose bills it informs, duplicates research that universities and the Academy already produce under peer review.

928 millió Ft a year — roughly 220 Ft per taxpayer — for research the universities and the Academy already produce, without a rival institution to check the findings.

1 bn HUF allocation 206 HUF / taxpayer / year 0 bn HUF Year-1 saving

What you see — and what you don't

The seen: a prestigious research institute producing comparative-law studies to improve Hungarian legislation. The unseen: every law faculty and the Academy's own legal-research network already does this work — under competitive pressure and peer review — while the institute's research priorities are set by the same minister whose legislation the studies are meant to scrutinise.

Objection

"But comparative legal research improves legislation — shouldn't the ministry have expert input?"

Answer

It does, and it pays for it twice. The ministry's own drafting staff are already funded to ground Hungarian law in workable international models. What a separate ministry-supervised institute adds is not expertise — it is the removal of that expertise from the competing institutions where a poor study is exposed by a rival's better one. The research function survives; the structural weakness — one body advising the office that funds and directs it — does not.

Share if you think legal research should compete in the open, not inside the ministry it advises.

The analyst's verdict

Mádl Ferenc Institute of Comparative Law

Rationale

The MFI is a central government research body, created in 2019, that produces international comparative-law studies and recommendations to inform domestic legislation.[^1] It was founded with a budget of 610 millió Ft for 2019, rising to a planned 850 millió Ft the following year[^2] — the 2026 line of 927.8 millió Ft is the continuation of that trajectory. The question the frame puts to this line is not whether comparative legal research has value — it does — but whether it requires a dedicated, tax-financed state institute. Comparative-law research is already produced, in volume, by the law faculties of ELTE, the University of Szeged, the Pázmány Péter Catholic University, the legal research network of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (the HUN-REN Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Jogtudományi Intézete), and the Ministry of Justice's own drafting staff, whose statutory job is to ground Hungarian legislation in workable models. Standing up a separate institute does not add a capacity that was missing; it duplicates one that exists, and it relocates the research from competing academic institutions — where the standard is peer review and where a poor study is exposed by a rival's better one — into a single body whose research priorities are set, and whose director is supervised, by the minister whose legislation the research is meant to inform. That is the structural weakness: comparative legal analysis commissioned and supervised by the office it advises has a built-in incentive to find that international experience supports the legislation already intended, and no rival institution inside the same structure to check it. Where research priority is genuinely contestable — which models to study, which jurisdictions to treat as comparators, which findings to publish first — a single state body cannot aggregate the dispersed judgement that a plural academic field expresses through competing publications; the institute substitutes one administrator's priority list for that discovery process. The comparative-law function should be returned to the universities and the Academy network, where it competes, and to the ministry's own drafting staff, who are already funded under the administration line above. The phase-out is short because the protected party is small and the skills are transferable.

Transition mechanism

Phase-Out over 2 years via severance-with-overlap. The institute employs a research staff of qualified lawyers and comparative-law scholars — a group with directly marketable skills in academia, private legal practice, and the ministry's own drafting function. The payroll component is the personnel allocation plus employer contributions: 726.9 + 100.6 = 827.5 millió Ft. Severance-with-overlap pays this payroll for 24 months while staff take university posts, private practice, or positions in the ministry's drafting directorate, keeping both incomes during the overlap. The non-payroll components — operating costs of 93.9 millió Ft and investment of 6.4 millió Ft, together 100.3 millió Ft — end in the first budget cycle. Year-1 and Year-2 net saving is the non-payroll envelope of 100.3 millió Ft (the 827.5 millió Ft payroll is still being paid as severance). From Year 3 the full 927.8 millió Ft is saved annually. Existing research commissions in progress are completed and published before the institute closes; unpublished work is transferred to the relevant university or to the Academy's Jogtudományi Intézet.

Affected groups

The institute's research staff — a small body of comparative-law scholars and qualified lawyers. The severance-with-overlap bridge gives 24 months of continued salary with the right to take new employment during the overlap; for a group with this skill profile, re-employment in academia, the ministry's drafting directorate, or private practice is the realistic household path, and the transition bonus inverts the usual incentive to resist. No citizen's life plan depends on the institute; its output is research that informs legislation, and that legislation continues to be drafted by the ministry.

Free Society Institute

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