65 billion Ft a year — and whoever administers the fund decides who gets capital.

Indoklás

The Területfejlesztési Alap is the chapter's second-largest line and the single largest discretionary item. It is a state fund that allocates 65,000.0 millió Ft — overwhelmingly capital spending — to regional-development projects selected by the ministry and the regional development councils. On the budget's own face the fund is matched by 65,000.0 millió Ft of own-revenue, so it appears fiscally self-contained; the analytical point is that the revenue is not a voluntary payment for a service but an earmarked transfer into a discretionary allocation pool, and the spending it funds is the object of analysis regardless of how the revenue line is labelled. Government cannot create capital; it can only redirect it. Every forint the Területfejlesztési Alap allocates to a politically-selected regional project is a forint of saving not deployed to the project a private investor, judging by expected yield to future consumers, would have selected. The visible result is the funded project — a road, a facility, a development site — announced with a named beneficiary region. The unseen result is the projects that did not happen because the saving was diverted: the capital deepening that raises real wages follows from investment selected by the test of voluntary future demand, not by the test of which regional council made the application. A state development fund does not add to the national capital stock; it changes who selects where the existing saving goes, from the entrepreneur facing a profit-and-loss plebiscite to the official facing a political one. This is also where the chapter touches the deepest structural feature of Hungarian fiscal debate. A discretionary fund that allocates 65 milliárd Ft of capital among regional applicants generates a rent: the applicant who aligns with the fund's stated priorities, or with the officials who administer it, obtains capital it did not have to earn from consumers. That rent exists independent of which government holds the allocation power and independent of how clean the tender process is. A more transparent Területfejlesztési Alap with better-credentialed recipients redirects the same rent to a different set of applicants; it does not eliminate the rent, because the rent is the discretionary allocation itself. The classical-liberal reform is not "administer the fund better" but "narrow the discretionary surface" — wind the fund down and let regional capital allocation return to the savers and investors whose own money is at stake.