107 milliárd Ft for tourism the state chose — not tourism visitors chose

Indoklás

At 107 milliárd Ft this is the second-largest line in the chapter and the largest of the discretionary-allocation programmes. Tourism development funded as a state programme directs capital toward tourism infrastructure, attractions, and destination projects chosen administratively. Tourism is a competitive consumer-services industry: hotels, attractions, restaurants, and tour operators compete for visitors and earn their return — or fail to — on the market. The state cannot determine, in the absence of price signals, which tourism projects warrant investment; developers, hoteliers, and investors who bear the gain and the loss can. When the state directs 107 milliárd Ft into tourism projects of its own selection, it bids capital, construction capacity, and labour away from whatever else those resources would have built — the houses not built, the manufacturing capacity not expanded — and the unseen cost is the foregone alternative use. Where a tourism project is genuinely viable, private capital will fund it; where it is not, the subsidy is the only thing keeping it standing. The line is classified phase-out rather than immediate cut because the capital component — 52 milliárd Ft of investment, with a matching 52 milliárd Ft of associated revenue — is plainly tied to multi-year development projects already under construction or contracted. Abrupt cancellation would strand half-built projects and breach commitments to contractors. The four-year horizon allows in-flight projects to complete.