A 2026-os költségvetés-elemzésből
52 milliárd Ft directed to selected firms — capital that crowds out every company that didn't apply.
Direct capital grants to chosen enterprises for energy modernisation: socialising the balance sheet of selected firms while the unsubsidised sector bears the full cost of its own investment.
Roughly 13,020 Ft per taxpayer per year — 52,000 millió Ft transferred to selected firms, collected from working-age earners through the payroll and consumption wedge.
Amit látsz — és amit nem
The seen: the named company that receives a grant and proceeds with its modernisation. The unseen: every company that competes against it and must recover capital costs the recipient did not, and the household whose payroll contribution funded the advantage.
Ellenvetés
"Without grants, smaller companies can't afford energy upgrades — they'd fall behind."
Válasz
Capital that would have flowed through ordinary saving and lending to whichever investment the market judged most valuable is instead directed to whichever applicant the ministry judged most deserving — with no price signal telling the ministry which investment yields the most. A subsidised firm's lower cost is not evidence it is more productive; it is evidence part of its cost was paid by someone else.
Share if you think capital should flow to the most productive firms, not the best-connected applicants.
Az elemző értékelése
Energia- és klímapolitikai modernizációs rendszer — Gazdálkodó és egyéb szervezetek támogatási programjai — felhalmozási
Az elemző indoklása jelenleg angol nyelven elérhető; magyar fordítás folyamatban.
Indoklás
This is the largest single discretionary item in the chapter after the two centrally-managed funds, and it is a direct transfer of capital to selected firms. The seen is the recipient enterprise: a named company receives a grant toward an energy-modernisation investment, and the investment proceeds. The unseen is everything that grant displaced. The 59.3 milliárd Ft does not appear from nowhere; it is collected from taxpayers — disproportionately working-age earners through the payroll and consumption wedge — and the firms that did not receive a grant face a competitor whose capital cost was partly socialised. A subsidised firm can underprice an unsubsidised rival not because it is more productive but because the state covered part of its balance sheet. Capital that would have flowed, through ordinary saving and lending, to whichever energy investment the market judged most valuable is instead directed to whichever applicant the ministry judged most deserving — and the ministry has no price signal telling it which investment yields the most. There is no contractual reliance interest that survives scrutiny here — grant applicants are not parties the state owes a phased exit; a grant not yet disbursed creates no enforceable claim. Immediate Cut.
Átállási mechanizmus
Eliminate in the 2026 cycle. No phased exit is required — grant applicants are not parties the state owes a phased exit; a grant not yet disbursed creates no enforceable claim.
Érintett csoportok
Firms that have applied for or received grants; competitor firms that did not receive a grant; taxpayers, disproportionately working-age earners through the payroll and consumption wedge.
Szabad Társadalom Intézet
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