A 2026-os költségvetés-elemzésből
180 milliárd Ft for two motorways on terms Hungary's own regulator called disadvantageous.
The M5 and M6 availability fees are predominantly euro-denominated — the exchange-rate risk sits with the Hungarian taxpayer, not the concessionaire.
About 46,200 Ft per taxpayer per year — 180,000.0 millió Ft total. Year-1 net saving of 22,500.0 millió Ft; the full fee is replaced by tendered operating cost as contracts expire.
Amit látsz — és amit nem
The seen: two motorways kept in operation under long-term PPP concession contracts. The unseen: the exchange-rate risk borne by the taxpayer rather than the concessionaire — a deviation from international practice that Hungary's own regulatory authority found cost the state over 100 milliárd Ft more than planned in the 2008–2012 period alone — and the protected investor return built into a fee that no competitive tender has tested.
Ellenvetés
"These are legally binding contracts — Hungary can't just walk away from them."
Válasz
No one proposes walking away. The M6 Budapest-Dunaújváros concession reaches its natural expiry in October 2026 — that section reverts without breaking any contract. The M5 expires by 2031; the remaining M6 sections through the late 2030s. As each expires, the mechanism switches to directly-tendered operating and maintenance, and the taxpayer stops funding the euro-denominated risk-asymmetric fee. The contracts are honoured to their terms; they are not renewed on the same terms.
Share if you think motorway contracts that cost Hungary 100 milliárd extra should not be renewed on the same terms.
Az elemző értékelése
M5, M6 autópálya rendelkezésre állási díjak
Az elemző indoklása jelenleg angol nyelven elérhető; magyar fordítás folyamatban.
Indoklás
This line — 180,000.0 millió Ft — funds the availability fees on the M5 and M6 motorways, which are financed under separate, older public-private-partnership concession contracts predating the 2022 network concession. The M5 concession was concluded in 1994 and comprehensively modified in 2004; the M6 sections were contracted between 2004 and 2008 on terms of 22 to 30 years. The M6 Budapest-Dunaújváros section's 22-year concession period, counted from the start of construction, reaches its end in October 2026. These contracts are the textbook case of the political-risk and calculation problems an availability-fee PPP concentrates. The fees are predominantly euro-denominated, with the Hungarian state bearing the exchange-rate risk — contrary to the international practice in which such risk is shared — and the Hungarian regulatory authority's own analysis found that the disadvantageous financial models cost the state over 100 milliárd Ft more than planned in the 2008-2012 period alone, with the contracts deviating from international practice in ways systematically unfavourable to the state. The classification again separates the asset from the financing arrangement. The M5 and M6 are durable motorway infrastructure; the PPP concessions through which they were financed are a contractual form that loaded exchange-rate risk and a protected investor return onto the taxpayer. The honest classification of the financing arrangement is Phase-Out, and the horizon here is shorter than for the 2022 network concession because these contracts are already reaching their natural expiry across this period — the M6 section in October 2026, the M5 by 2031, the remaining M6 sections by the later 2030s. The phase-out is therefore largely the disciplined non-renewal of expiring contracts: as each concession reaches its term, the motorway it covers reverts to direct, competitively-tendered operation and maintenance rather than being rolled into a successor availability-fee concession. An 8-year horizon spans the cluster of expiry dates and treats the line as the run-off of a set of finite, expiring contracts.
Átállási mechanizmus
Phase-Out over 8 years, linear glide. The protected party is the existing PPP concessionaires, whose contracts are honoured to their contractual expiry rather than repudiated. The mechanism is the disciplined non-renewal of each concession as it reaches its term: the M6 Budapest-Dunaújváros section in 2026, the M5 in 2031, the remaining M6 sections through the later 2030s, with each reverting on expiry to directly-budgeted, competitively-tendered operation. Net saving rises from 22,500.0 millió Ft in Year 1 to the full 180,000.0 millió Ft in Year 8 as the concessions run off and the availability-fee structure is replaced by tendered operating-and-maintenance cost. As with the network concession, the "full saving" is the elimination of the availability-fee structure; the genuine operating cost of the M5 and M6 reappears as a tendered budgeted line below the fee.
Érintett csoportok
The M5 and M6 PPP concessionaires, whose contractual rights are honoured to expiry. Motorway users, unaffected in service terms. Taxpayers, who over the eight-year run-off cease funding the euro-denominated, risk-asymmetric concession fees and fund instead the tendered cost of operating the two motorways.
Források
- A Magyar Állam szempontjából rendkívül kedvezőtlen szerződéseket kötöttek a 2010 előtti kormányok az M5 és az M6 jelzésű autópályák koncessziós hasznosítása érdekében · Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatósága (SZTFH) (2022)
- M6 autópálya PPP koncesszió — Mészáros Lőrinc, Szíjj László, ÉKM · Telex (G7) (2026)
Szabad Társadalom Intézet
Támogasd a független elemzéseket
Kutatásunk ingyenes, nyílt és nem szponzorált. Ha hasznosnak találod, segíts fenntartani.