A 2026-os költségvetés-elemzésből
20 billion forints of hiring subsidies — some paying employers for decisions they had already made.
Discretionary employment grants allocated by county offices generate a well-documented deadweight problem: a share of subsidised hires would have happened without the subsidy, so the levy partly rewards the employers who applied, not the employment that wouldn't otherwise exist.
20,000 millió Ft annually from the payroll levy, routed through county-office discretion to employers whose applications reached the right desk.
Amit látsz — és amit nem
The seen: employers receiving wage subsidies and grants, county offices administering the programme. The unseen: every payer of the payroll levy whose contribution covers a hiring decision their employer had already taken — the deadweight portion that benefits the grant-recipient without changing the employment outcome.
Ellenvetés
"Wage subsidies help small employers take a chance on a worker they might not otherwise hire — cutting them punishes firms that do the right thing."
Válasz
The placement benefit — paying the worker who moves from public works into a real competitive-sector job — is worth keeping precisely because it pays for a verified outcome. The broader discretionary subsidy does not distinguish between hires that needed the incentive and hires that would have happened anyway. Three years to run off existing contracts; no new discretionary grants from year one.
Share if you think public money should pay for employment outcomes, not for employers who know how to fill out a grant application.
Az elemző értékelése
Foglalkoztatási támogatások
Az elemző indoklása jelenleg angol nyelven elérhető; magyar fordítás folyamatban.
Indoklás
This line covers discretionary employment subsidies — wage subsidies, employer grants, and assorted active-labour-market support outside the public-works and training lines. It is a discretionary allocation: the county government office decides which employers receive a subsidy to hire which workers. That is a classic public-choice exposure — the benefit concentrates on the employers and intermediaries who receive the grant and know how to apply for it, while the cost spreads across every payer of the payroll levy. The deadweight problem is well known for hiring subsidies: a share of subsidised hires would have happened anyway, so the levy partly pays employers for decisions they had already made. A three-year phase-out is appropriate because some current subsidy agreements are multi-year wage-subsidy contracts with employers who hired in reliance on the continued payment; abrupt cancellation would strand those hiring decisions. The placement-benefit instrument (payment to a worker who actually moves into a competitive-sector job, currently 45,600 Ft monthly[^4]) is the one component of this cluster worth retaining, because it pays for a validated outcome rather than an administrative judgement; it can be folded into the Start-munkaprogram placement channel. The remainder winds down over three years as existing subsidy contracts expire.
Átállási mechanizmus
Three-year run-off of existing multi-year subsidy contracts; no new discretionary employer-subsidy commitments from year 1; placement-benefit component retained and merged with the public-works transition channel.
Érintett csoportok
Employers on current wage-subsidy contracts (protected to contract expiry); the administering county offices.
Szabad Társadalom Intézet
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