State Asset Revenues and Expenditures

Capital injections into NGM-portfolio SOEs — principally MVM and state banks. At 60,500 mFt, this is the chapter's largest discretionary item. SOEs requiring recurring capital injections are not covering their cost of capital — a signal of poor management or unacknowledged public-service obligations that should be funded transparently rather than hidden in equity. The 7-year phase-out requires each SOE to achieve self-sufficiency or be privatised. This costs each SZJA payer roughly 13,444 Ft per year.

Rental costs for housing central government bodies in privately-owned premises — a consequence of the state not owning sufficient appropriate accommodation for its own operations. A nominal freeze prevents expansion and creates pressure to rationalise space usage across central government bodies. The FSI's preferred direction is reducing the number of central government bodies requiring accommodation, which reduces this line organically. Benchmarking rental costs against market rates for equivalent commercial space is the appropriate annual discipline.

Maintenance and custodial costs for MNV's managed properties — a necessary operational expenditure for any asset portfolio of this scale. Without maintenance, state assets deteriorate and disposal values fall; deferred maintenance is not saving but value destruction. The FSI keeps this line. The reform argument is for a systematic divestiture programme that reduces the portfolio over time, shrinking the maintenance obligation proportionately. Annual condition audits should identify properties where disposal is more cost-effective than continued maintenance.

The National Film Institute receives 11,800 mFt in operating subsidy, selecting which Hungarian films get produced. Austrian price theory is clear: state-directed cultural production distorts the price signal that reveals audience demand. Films that attract voluntary viewers can attract private investment; films requiring subsidy reveal a preference divergence between commissioners and the public. The 5-year phase-out runs out existing commitments. This costs each SZJA payer roughly 2,622 Ft per year.

MNV Zrt.'s institutional running costs — administration, legal, IT, and governance for managing 16,000 billion Ft of state assets and approximately 150 portfolio companies. A nominal freeze is appropriate: this is a core state function, but an institution managing assets at this scale should be subject to annual performance benchmarking. The preferred reform is publishing MNV's portfolio return alongside management cost, to make the value-added of active state asset management visible and auditable.

Environmental liability financing from state ownership — covering the costs of legacy contamination and environmental obligations arising from the state's historical ownership of industrial sites. This is a constitutional obligation: the state as the responsible polluter under its historical ownership must fund remediation. The FSI keeps this line. The relevant reform is ensuring that current privatisations include enforceable environmental warranties that shift future liabilities to buyers rather than accumulating further state exposure.

NTH (National Capital Holding) equity fund expenditures — a parallel line to XLIII-E14, covering NTH's state-managed investment vehicles. The Telex investigation found NTH had not demonstrated any rationalisation results before announcing further expansion. State venture capital at this scale crowds out private risk capital and provides no market discipline on portfolio selection or exit. The 5-year phase-out at 20% per year allows existing portfolio positions to wind down. This costs each SZJA payer roughly 2,000 Ft per year.

A residual catch-all for miscellaneous asset management costs not allocated to the main MNV expenditure heads. At 8,000 mFt this is material enough to require transparency. The FSI requires sub-itemisation in the supplementary budget tables for any programme above 500 mFt within this category. A nominal freeze is the only available discipline until itemisation is provided; once sub-classified, individual lines can be assessed on their own merits.

State equity fund contributions under NGM's portfolio — funding for venture and mezzanine capital funds managed by the National Capital Holding (NTH). The chapter analysis references Telex reporting that NTH announced further capital deployment without first demonstrating any efficiency improvement from prior allocations. Public-choice theory predicts exactly this: state venture capital has no hard budget constraint, no exit discipline, and no independent price signal for portfolio quality. The 5-year phase-out redirects the economy's innovation financing toward the private capital market. This costs each SZJA payer roughly 1,550 Ft per year.

Pre-financing of EU project costs by MNV before EU reimbursement arrives — a cash-flow bridge for state capital projects funded from EU programmes. The FSI keeps this line: the pre-financing is recovered from EU reimbursements (XLIII-R9) and is essentially a revolving credit instrument for EU project execution. The relevant efficiency question is whether pre-financing rates are optimised to minimise the time between disbursement and reimbursement — not whether to eliminate the mechanism.

MNV Zrt. manages approximately 550,000 properties and assets worth roughly 16,000 billion Ft on behalf of the state. Strategic real-estate acquisition within this portfolio — covering operational government premises and essential state facilities — is a legitimate asset-management function. The FSI keeps this line at its current level; the reform argument is for accelerating divestiture of non-strategic commercial properties, not for expanding the acquisition programme. Acquisitions here should be offset by disposals elsewhere in the MNV portfolio.

When Hungarian citizens die intestate with no heirs, the state inherits by law — a constitutional arrangement under civil-code succession rules. Processing inherited estates requires legal, cadastral, and administrative costs. The FSI keeps this line: this is a core legal-order function, equivalent to contract enforcement. The state as backstop successor ensures that estates are administered rather than abandoned, which protects creditors and maintains property-rights clarity in the land and assets registries.

VAT settlement costs on MNV's transactions — a tax compliance obligation arising from MNV's role as owner and active transactor of state assets. VAT settlements on disposals and acquisitions are legally required; the amount is determined by transaction volume and applicable rates on property transfers. The FSI keeps this line. No discretionary element exists; the cost contracts automatically as the MNV divestiture programme reduces the portfolio and transaction frequency declines.

Chapter reserve for Chapter XLIII — a small contingency appropriation within the state asset management chapter. At 1,000 mFt, this is a modest buffer for unforeseen asset management costs. The FSI keeps this line: a working contingency within a chapter managing 16,000 billion Ft of assets is operationally justified. The amount is bounded and purpose-limited; unlike the large central reserves in Chapter XLII, this is proportionate to the chapter's scope.

Legacy liabilities arising from prior state ownership decisions — contractual obligations inherited from historical privatisations, nationalisation reversals, or other ownership transitions that left residual claims on the state. These are legal obligations, not discretionary spending. The FSI keeps this line at its current (small) level; the reform argument is for ensuring future privatisation contracts include complete liability waivers that prevent addition to this stock.

Capital transfers to small companies within MNV's portfolio — a residual funding mechanism for MNV-managed entities that require operational support. At 605 mFt this is small; a nominal freeze signals that these entities should achieve financial self-sufficiency or be divested. The preferred FSI outcome is that MNV portfolio companies operate without ongoing budget transfers; if they require recurring subsidy, they are candidates for privatisation or dissolution, not indefinite capitalisation.

Capital transfers to companies within the Hungarian Tourism Agency's (MTÜ) portfolio — the state capitalising tourism-sector companies through the regulatory and promotional agency. State-managed tourism investment exhibits the same calculation problem as any state industrial policy: the price signal that would reveal whether the investment generates sustainable visitor demand is replaced by a political allocation. The 3-year phase-out redirects tourism investment toward private-market and concession mechanisms. This costs each SZJA payer roughly 111 Ft per year — small, but the principle matters.

A residual miscellaneous expenditure line for NGM's ownership portfolio at 50 mFt — trivially small. Nominal freeze is the appropriate posture for any unitemised residual. At this size the administrative cost of reforming the line exceeds any saving; the FSI's preference is for this amount to roll into the larger NGM administrative budget line where it can be audited in aggregate.