Chapter XLIII: Az Állami Vagyonnal Kapcsolatos Bevételek és Kiadások (State Asset-Related Revenues and Expenditures)

Overview

Chapter XLIII consolidates all transactions arising from the Hungarian state’s ownership of real property, movable assets, and equity stakes in state-owned or state-controlled companies. It is administered across four principal titles: (1) the Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő Zrt. (MNV Zrt. — Hungarian National Asset Management Company), which manages the portfolio of assets entrusted to it by the state; (2) the Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium (NGM — Ministry of National Economy), which exercises ownership rights over a separate portfolio of strategically designated companies; (3) the Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség Zrt. (MTU — Hungarian Tourism Agency), which manages tourism-related state assets; and (4) the Nemzeti Tőkeholding Zrt. (NTH — National Capital Holding Company), which administers state-backed venture and growth capital funds.

The chapter carries a net deficit: total expenditures are 174,620.8 millió Ft against total revenues of 142,451.5 millió Ft, producing a net cost to the central budget of 32,169.3 millió Ft. Much of the revenue side is non-tax — it consists of dividends from state-owned enterprises, asset sales, rental income, and concession fees, making this chapter one of the few that generates substantial own-revenue.

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Expenditure Analysis

Title 1 — MNV Zrt. Rábízott Vagyonával Kapcsolatos Kiadások (MNV Zrt. Entrusted Asset Expenditures)

Ingatlan beruházások, ingatlan és egyéb eszközök vásárlása (Real Estate Investment and Acquisition)

• Current allocation: 13.0 millió Ft (operating) + 3,887.0 millió Ft (capital) = 3,900.0 millió Ft total
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: To the extent the state owns property that must be managed until privatized, minimal maintenance capital is necessary. However, the state has no compelling economic rationale for acquiring new real estate when private markets exist. Austrian theory holds that state property ownership short-circuits the market price discovery process: without private bidders competing, asset valuation is necessarily arbitrary. New acquisitions expand the state’s portfolio rather than contracting it, working against the privatization objective.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze at current nominal level immediately. New acquisitions should be prohibited except where required to remediate environmental liabilities already on the state balance sheet (see environmental expenditure below). The capital budget should be redirected exclusively toward preparing assets for sale.
• Affected groups: MNV Zrt. staff managing procurement; private sellers who would otherwise transact at market prices.

Ingó- és ingatlan vagyonelemek fenntartása és őrzése (Maintenance and Security of Movable and Real Property)

• Current allocation: 14,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (5 years)
• Rationale: This is the single largest operational expenditure within MNV Zrt.’s entrusted portfolio. A portion — maintenance of assets actively being held for sale — is economically justified in the short term, as neglect destroys sale value. However, the bulk of the portfolio reflects a failure of prior privatization policy: assets the state acquired or retained that now consume public resources merely to be kept from deteriorating. Hayek’s knowledge problem is acute here: centralized maintenance cannot reflect the dispersed, locally specific information that private owners use to allocate maintenance spending efficiently.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Conduct a full audit of the asset portfolio, categorizing each property as (a) sold within 12 months, (b) transferred to a municipality or public-use institution, or (c) environmentally encumbered and requiring remediation. Years 2-3: Outsource all maintenance contracts to private firms via competitive tender; cease direct employment for maintenance tasks. Years 4-5: As portfolio shrinks through privatization, reduce this line proportionally. Target: 50% real reduction by year 5.
• Affected groups: Maintenance staff and contracted firms currently employed by or working for MNV Zrt.; occupants of state-owned premises.

Központi költségvetési szervek elhelyezésével kapcsolatos bérleti díjak (Rental Costs for Accommodation of Central Government Bodies)

• Current allocation: 28,871.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This line represents rent paid by the state to (predominantly) itself or to private landlords for housing central government offices. Where the state pays rent to private parties, this is a genuine market transaction and the cost is real. Where it is an intra-governmental accounting transfer, it is a notional flow that inflates both expenditure and revenue statistics simultaneously. The amount is large — nearly 29 billion Ft — and reflects the distributed spatial footprint of the Hungarian central administration. From an Austrian perspective, this cost is driven by the size of the bureaucracy itself: the sustainable path to reduction runs through downsizing the agencies occupying the space, not through negotiating lower rents.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze the rental budget nominally. As government agencies are consolidated or eliminated (as recommended in their respective chapter analyses), the space requirements will fall and leases can be terminated. No additional office space contracts should be signed. Long-term owned government buildings should be offered for sale via competitive tender, with proceeds earmarked for debt reduction.
• Affected groups: Private landlords receiving rental payments; civil servants occupying rented premises.

Az MNV Zrt. tulajdonosi joggyakorlásába tartozó társaságok forrásjuttatásai (Capital Transfers to Companies Under MNV Zrt. Ownership)

• Current allocation: 550.0 millió Ft (operating) + 54.8 millió Ft (capital) = 604.8 millió Ft total
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: These are direct subsidies to state-owned companies under MNV Zrt.’s ownership. Austrian economics identifies this as a canonical form of corporate welfare: losses that the market would require a private owner to bear are socialized, insulating management from the profit-and-loss discipline that alone generates rational resource allocation. Each forrásjuttatás (capital injection) prevents the price system from sending the signal that resources are being misused. There is no demonstrated market failure that requires state ownership of these specific enterprises.
• Transition mechanism: Immediate cessation of operating subsidies. Capital injections to be halted in Year 1. MNV Zrt. to initiate a structured privatization process for all companies in this portfolio: public auction within 18 months or, if no buyers, orderly liquidation. Companies currently operating at a loss and dependent on these transfers will either be acquired by strategic private investors, restructured, or wound down.
• Affected groups: Employees of MNV-owned companies currently subsidized; management of those companies; creditors.

A Nemzeti Filmintézet Közhasznú Nonprofit Zrt. támogatása (Support for the National Film Institute)

• Current allocation: 11,800.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The Nemzeti Filmintézet (NFI) is the state body responsible for financing Hungarian film production, distributing subsidies to directors and producers, and managing film heritage. From an Austrian standpoint, cultural subsidies are a paradigmatic misallocation: the state uses tax revenue (extracted by compulsion) to fund creative outputs that voluntary audiences have not demonstrated willingness to pay for at market rates. The subjective value theory implies that “cultural value” is no less subjective than any other preference — the state has no epistemic standing to elevate certain artistic works above others. At 11.8 billion Ft, this is the single largest company-level subsidy in the chapter. Hungarian film production that generates genuine audience demand will attract private investment; film that cannot attract voluntary funding reveals that its value to potential viewers is insufficient to justify its production cost.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Announce the closure of the subsidy window; commit to honoring only contracts already signed and mid-production at the date of announcement. Year 2: No new project grants. The NFI transitions to a heritage and archive function only (preserving existing national film heritage), at a fraction of current cost. Film archive functions may be transferred to the national library or cultural heritage institution. Private investment incentives (tax credits, co-production treaties) should be reviewed separately and, if retained, designed without discretionary bureaucratic gatekeeping.
• Affected groups: Hungarian film directors, producers, and production houses currently dependent on NFI grants; film industry workers; international co-production partners.

Az MNV Zrt. működésének támogatása (Operational Support for MNV Zrt.)

• Current allocation: 10,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (3 years)
• Rationale: MNV Zrt. is the administrative body that manages the state asset portfolio. Its existence is only justified while the state holds assets that require management. Under a privatization-first strategy, MNV Zrt.’s portfolio should shrink rapidly, and accordingly its operational budget should decline in proportion. A 10 billion Ft operating cost for a government-owned asset management company is symptomatic of the organizational overhead that accompanies state ownership — costs that private owners internalize and minimize through competitive pressure.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Operational budget capped at 10,000 millió Ft; internal review to identify redundant functions. Year 2: Budget reduced to 7,000 millió Ft as portfolio shrinks; headcount reduction commensurate with assets transferred or sold. Year 3: Budget reduced to 4,000 millió Ft or closed entirely if the residual portfolio is small enough to be managed by a remaining Treasury function. Any residual environmental or heritage asset management can be contracted privately.
• Affected groups: MNV Zrt. employees (approximately 400–600 staff); contracted advisors and lawyers supporting the organization.

Az állam tulajdonosi felelősségével kapcsolatos környezetvédelmi feladatok finanszírozása (Financing Environmental Tasks Arising from State Ownership Liability)

• Current allocation: 9,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This line covers the remediation of environmental contamination on state-owned or formerly state-owned land — legacy pollution from industrial operations under prior public ownership. This is a genuine liability: the state, as successor owner, bears legal responsibility for remediation. From an Austrian perspective, environmental liabilities arising from past state-sector industrial activity represent a form of historical externality that the state must discharge before it can privatize the affected land. Failure to remediate would transfer the liability to private buyers through adverse selection, distorting the privatization market. This expenditure is therefore consistent with the orderly liquidation of state assets and should be maintained until the identified liabilities are cleared.
• Transition mechanism: Maintain at current level; require MNV Zrt. to publish a time-bounded remediation schedule for each liability site with projected completion dates and costs. As individual sites are remediated and sold, the allocated amount should decline accordingly.
• Affected groups: Communities near contaminated sites; potential private purchasers of the affected land.

Az államot korábbi tulajdonosi döntéseihez kapcsolódóan terhelő egyéb kiadások (Other Expenditures Arising from Prior State Ownership Decisions)

• Current allocation: 700.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: Similar to the environmental liability line, this covers residual obligations flowing from past state ownership decisions — likely including legal settlements, compensation claims, and warranty-type obligations from prior privatizations. These are contractual or legally mandated payments that cannot be unilaterally avoided without further legal cost. Honoring prior legal commitments is consistent with rule-of-law principles that Austrian economics endorses as a precondition for functioning markets.
• Transition mechanism: Maintain until underlying obligations are extinguished. Require legal review of each obligation to assess whether renegotiation is possible. No new discretionary obligations of this type should be incurred.
• Affected groups: Counterparties holding claims against the Hungarian state arising from prior ownership transactions.

ÁFA elszámolás (VAT Settlement)

• Current allocation: 1,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This is a VAT accounting item — the net VAT payable or reclaimable on MNV Zrt.’s asset transactions. It is a derivative of transaction volumes and cannot be independently targeted without affecting the underlying transactions. As privatization proceeds and transaction volumes change, this amount will adjust endogenously.
• Transition mechanism: No independent policy action; freeze at current nominal level as a budget planning figure.
• Affected groups: Hungarian Tax Authority (NAV) as counterparty.

Egyéb vagyonkezelési kiadások (Other Asset Management Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 8,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This is a catch-all line for miscellaneous costs associated with operating the state asset portfolio. Without further itemization it is difficult to classify precisely; however, the size (8 billion Ft) suggests material discretionary spending that should be subject to spending review. Nominally freezing this category prevents further expansion while a detailed audit is conducted.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze immediately. Require MNV Zrt. to provide a line-by-line breakdown as a condition of budget approval. Any item that cannot be justified as directly supporting privatization or legacy liability resolution should be eliminated in Year 2.
• Affected groups: MNV Zrt. staff and contractors benefiting from discretionary spending.

Állami örökléssel kapcsolatos kiadások elszámolása (Settlement of Expenditures Related to State Succession)

• Current allocation: 2,820.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: When a deceased person dies intestate and without heirs, their estate escheats to the state under Hungarian law. This expenditure covers the administrative costs of managing those estates — legal proceedings, property surveys, and disposal. This is an inherent legal function that will not be eliminated by policy choice; it is determined by demographic and social conditions. However, the administrative overhead can be reduced by streamlining procedures and, ultimately, by auctioning escheated assets rapidly rather than retaining them in the state portfolio.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze at current nominal level. Introduce a mandatory 90-day auction period for all escheated assets after legal proceedings conclude, rather than retaining them in the state portfolio indefinitely.
• Affected groups: Legal administrators, courts handling succession proceedings, eventual purchasers of escheated assets.

Európai Uniós pályázatokhoz forrás biztosítása (Pre-financing for EU-Funded Projects)

• Current allocation: 5,900.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This is a bridge-financing mechanism: the state advances funds for EU co-financed projects and is later reimbursed (the corresponding revenue item is 5,900.0 millió Ft). On a net basis this line is revenue-neutral — the revenue line offsets the expenditure exactly. However, bridge financing represents a real cost (opportunity cost of capital and administrative overhead). The arrangement is driven by EU program requirements and cannot be eliminated unilaterally; freezing at current nominal level is appropriate.
• Transition mechanism: No independent policy action beyond the nominal freeze. As individual EU program periods wind down, this amount should diminish naturally.
• Affected groups: Project beneficiaries dependent on timely pre-financing; EU program administrators.

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Title 2 — NGM Tulajdonosi Joggyakorlásával Kapcsolatos Kiadások (NGM Ownership Exercise Expenditures)

Az NGM tulajdonosi joggyakorlása alá tartozó társaságok forrásjuttatásai (Capital Transfers to Companies Under NGM Ownership)

• Current allocation: 60,500.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Phase-Out (5 years)
• Rationale: This is the largest expenditure item in the entire chapter: 60.5 billion Ft in capital injections into state-owned enterprises whose ownership rights are exercised directly by the Ministry of National Economy. These companies span a wide range of sectors — utilities, transport, financial services, and others — where the Hungarian state has retained or extended ownership. From an Austrian perspective, this is the paradigmatic case of malinvestment: capital is allocated by political decision rather than by profit-and-loss signals. Ludwig von Mises’s socialist calculation argument applies directly — without market prices for capital goods, the ministry cannot determine whether the 60.5 billion Ft is being deployed in its highest-valued use. The “seen” effect is the companies receiving capital; the “unseen” (per Bastiat) is the private investment that does not occur because this capital is diverted from voluntary market participants.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Full public audit and disclosure of each company in the NGM portfolio with its financial performance, the justification for each transfer, and a privatization timeline. Year 2: No new discretionary capital injections beyond those required to honor existing legally binding commitments. Years 3-5: Structured privatization of each company, prioritizing those in sectors with functioning private markets (financial services, construction, non-essential utilities). Companies in sectors with genuine network-externality characteristics (e.g., electricity transmission infrastructure) may be retained temporarily under a regulatory framework, but without discretionary equity injections.
• Affected groups: Employees of NGM-portfolio state companies (large, potentially tens of thousands across all entities); suppliers; sectoral competitors who face state-subsidized competition; taxpayers.

Tőkealapok feletti tulajdonosi joggyakorláshoz kapcsolódó kiadások (Expenditures Related to Ownership of Capital Funds)

• Current allocation: 6,975.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: This line funds NGM’s participation in venture and growth capital funds — state-directed equity investments into businesses. The economic case for state venture capital is particularly weak: private venture capitalists bear their own losses and therefore have strong incentives to select viable projects. State-directed venture capital creates moral hazard — fund managers who face no personal downside loss are prone to political allocation rather than commercial selection. Hungary’s domestic venture capital market has developed substantially; further state injections crowd out private capital and distort valuations.
• Transition mechanism: Halt all new capital commitments to state-backed funds in Year 1. Existing fund commitments should be honored only where legal obligations require it; no rollovers or new fund vehicles. NTH and related vehicles to be wound down over 2-3 years as investments mature or are sold to private buyers.
• Affected groups: Portfolio companies receiving state venture funding; private co-investors; NTH employees and fund managers.

Egyéb kiadások NGM (Other NGM Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 50.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: A minor miscellaneous line. At 50 millió Ft, the administrative cost of tracking and managing this item likely approaches its value. Its elimination simplifies the budget.
• Transition mechanism: Eliminate in Year 1.
• Affected groups: Minimal — small number of administrative personnel.

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Title 3 — Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség Zrt. Tulajdonosi Kiadások (MTU Ownership Expenditures)

A Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség Zrt. tulajdonosi joggyakorlása alá tartozó gazdasági társaságok forrásjuttatásai (Capital Transfers to Companies Under MTU Ownership)

• Current allocation: 500.0 millió Ft (operating)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The Magyar Turisztikai Ügynökség Zrt. (Hungarian Tourism Agency) exercises ownership rights over seven companies, including operators of regional airports (notably Sármellék/Hévíz-Balaton airport) and other tourism infrastructure. The tourism sector is a functioning private market globally; state ownership of tourism assets is unnecessary and introduces the political distortions typical of all state enterprise. Subsidizing loss-making tourism companies from public funds transfers the costs of political tourism strategies to taxpayers. Private investors — including international tourism and hospitality groups — would be willing purchasers of properly run tourism assets.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Cease operating subsidies to MTU-owned companies. Begin competitive privatization tender for all seven companies. Priority to transparent public auction. Where companies require transitional support to reach a saleable state, a one-time capped restructuring budget (not exceeding 200 millió Ft) may be authorized, reducing immediately thereafter.
• Affected groups: Employees of MTU-owned companies; regional communities dependent on MTU-operated infrastructure (particularly Sármellék airport).

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Title 4 — Nemzeti Tőkeholding Zrt. Tulajdonosi Kiadások (NTH Ownership Expenditures)

A Nemzeti Tőkeholding Zrt. tőkealapokkal kapcsolatos tulajdonosi kiadásai (NTH Capital Fund Ownership Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 9,000.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The Nemzeti Tőkeholding Zrt. is the state’s primary vehicle for managing and investing in domestic private equity and venture capital funds. It has invested in 488 companies via 1,097 billion Ft in total investments (as of recent data), positioning the state as a major player in Hungary’s capital market. This is a profound distortion: the state uses tax-extracted capital to make equity investments in private firms, systematically competing with private venture capitalists and distorting the return profile that private investors face. There is no market failure that justifies this role — Hungary’s capital markets, while not fully developed, have private participants willing to invest in viable companies. The state’s presence crowds them out and creates political allocation of capital rather than economic allocation.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1: Halt all new fund commitments. Announce wind-down of NTH. Existing fund positions to be sold to private buyers at market prices via a transparent process over 2-3 years. NTH operational staff to be reduced in proportion to the shrinking portfolio. No new fund vehicles to be established.
• Affected groups: Portfolio companies receiving NTH-backed capital; private fund managers co-investing alongside NTH; NTH employees; venture capital ecosystem participants.

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Title 7 — Fejezeti Tartalék (Chapter Reserve)

Fejezeti tartalék (Chapter Contingency Reserve)

• Current allocation: 1,000.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: Contingency reserves in state asset management budgets are instruments of discretionary spending: they allow the asset management authority to deploy funds without specific parliamentary authorization. From a constitutional economics perspective (consistent with Austrian institutional analysis), this defeats the purpose of budget appropriation as a limit on executive spending. Any genuine unforeseen expenditure should be funded through a supplementary budget request.
• Transition mechanism: Eliminate in Year 1. If emergency asset-related expenditures arise, fund via parliamentary supplementary appropriation.
• Affected groups: MNV Zrt. management (loss of discretionary flexibility); parliamentary oversight bodies (gain of control).

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Revenue Items

MNV Zrt. Rábízott Vagyon — Revenues

Ingatlan értékesítésből származó bevételek (Revenue from Real Estate Sales)

• Name: Ingatlan értékesítésből származó bevételek (Revenue from Real Estate Sales)
• Current yield: 18,500.0 millió Ft
• Type: Asset sale proceeds
• Notes: Proceeds from the sale of state-owned real property managed by MNV Zrt. This is the largest single revenue item within the MNV Zrt. portfolio and represents genuine market transactions. From an Austrian perspective, privatization sales are beneficial: they transfer assets from politically administered ownership to price-system governance. If the expenditure cuts recommended above are implemented — particularly the halt on new acquisitions and the phase-out of maintenance spending as assets are sold — this revenue line should grow in the near term as the pace of disposal accelerates, then decline as the portfolio is exhausted. A growing revenue line here is a sign of success, not a budget problem.

Egyéb eszközök értékesítéséből származó bevételek (Revenue from Sale of Other Assets)

• Name: Egyéb eszközök értékesítéséből származó bevételek (Revenue from Sale of Other Assets)
• Current yield: 1,355.0 millió Ft
• Type: Asset sale proceeds
• Notes: Revenue from disposal of movable state assets (vehicles, equipment, furniture, etc.). Consistent with privatization objectives; should increase as asset portfolio is rationalized.

Bérleti díjak (Rental Income)

• Name: Bérlati díjak (Rental Income on State Property)
• Current yield: 2,229.3 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / commercial income
• Notes: Income from renting state-owned properties to private parties. This revenue would decline as properties are sold rather than rented, but selling is preferable to retaining for rental income — renting perpetuates state ownership and the associated management costs.

Vagyonkezelői díj (Asset Management Fee)

• Name: Vagyonkezelői díj (Asset Management Fee)
• Current yield: 2,184.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee
• Notes: Fees charged to entities (typically public institutions) for whom MNV Zrt. manages assets under formal vagyonkezelési (asset management) contracts. These fees partially offset MNV Zrt.’s operating costs. As the portfolio is privatized and vagyonkezelési arrangements terminated, this revenue will decline; however, it will be accompanied by larger reductions in expenditure.

Tulajdoni részesedések értékesítéséből származó bevétel (Revenue from Sale of Equity Stakes)

• Name: Tulajdoni részesedések értékesítéséből (Revenue from Equity Stake Sales)
• Current yield: 5.0 millió Ft
• Type: Asset sale proceeds
• Notes: A minor amount, likely representing small or residual equity positions disposed of through MNV Zrt. Should increase substantially if privatization of MNV-portfolio companies is pursued as recommended.

Osztalékbevételek — MNV (Dividend Revenue — MNV Portfolio)

• Name: Osztalékbevételek (Dividend Revenue, MNV Zrt. portfolio)
• Current yield: 40.0 millió Ft
• Type: Dividend from state-owned enterprises
• Notes: Dividends received from companies under MNV Zrt. ownership. The modest amount relative to the 10.6 billion Ft in expenditures (company subsidies + MNV operating support) for the MNV corporate portfolio indicates that the portfolio is a net fiscal drain. This reinforces the case for immediate privatization.

Vegyes bevételek (Miscellaneous Revenue)

• Name: Vegyes bevételek (Miscellaneous Revenue)
• Current yield: 7,673.0 millió Ft
• Type: Other
• Notes: A catch-all revenue line covering various non-categorized income streams from the MNV Zrt. asset portfolio. The large amount relative to other fee items suggests it includes settlements, penalties, or other one-off items. A detailed breakdown should be required.

Állami örökléssel kapcsolatos értékesítési bevételek (Revenue from Sales Related to State Succession/Escheat)

• Name: Állami örökléssel kapcsolatos értékesítési bevételek (Escheat Revenue)
• Current yield: 2,484.0 millió Ft (operating) + 276.0 millió Ft (capital) = 2,760.0 millió Ft
• Type: Asset sale proceeds
• Notes: Revenue from the sale of escheated estates (property of those who died without heirs). Corresponds approximately to the 2,820.0 millió Ft expenditure on managing these estates. Net cost of the state succession function is approximately 60 millió Ft annually — a minor fiscal burden, but the process should be accelerated as recommended.

Az EU pályázatok megelőlegezéseinek visszatérülése (Repayment of EU Project Pre-financing)

• Name: EU projektek megelőlegezéseinek visszatérülése (EU Pre-financing Repayments)
• Current yield: 5,900.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Type: EU transfer (reimbursement)
• Notes: Repayment from the EU of pre-financed project costs. This is the exact counterpart to the 5,900.0 millió Ft capital expenditure; on a net basis, this flow is revenue-neutral.

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NGM Tulajdonosi Joggyakorlás — Revenues

Osztalékbevétel — NGM (Dividend Revenue — NGM Portfolio)

• Name: Osztalékbevétel (Dividend Revenue, NGM portfolio)
• Current yield: 94,805.2 millió Ft
• Type: Dividend from state-owned enterprises
• Notes: By far the largest revenue item in the chapter: 94.8 billion Ft in dividends from companies in the NGM ownership portfolio. This portfolio includes large state-owned enterprises — likely including MVM (Hungarian electricity holding), MOL (partially), national rail, postal services, and others. The dividend yield offsets a substantial portion of the 60.5 billion Ft capital injection on the expenditure side, producing a net positive of approximately 34.3 billion Ft from the NGM corporate portfolio. However, from an Austrian perspective, the dividend received does not justify retaining state ownership: private owners would likely generate higher returns (and hence higher tax yields) from the same assets if purchased at market value. The dividend revenue is the “seen” benefit; the “unseen” costs include political interference in pricing, hiring, and investment decisions at these enterprises, which reduces their long-term productivity and competitiveness.

Koncessziós díjak (Concession Fees)

• Name: Koncessziós díjak (Concession Fees)
• Current yield: 7,000.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / concession revenue
• Notes: Payments from private operators holding state-granted concessions (gambling, certain infrastructure, natural resources, etc.). Concession revenue reflects state monopoly rights granted to selected private operators — itself a form of rent-seeking that distorts competition. Where concessions reflect genuine natural resource royalties or temporary franchise arrangements with competitive bidding, they are relatively benign. Where they reflect exclusivity grants that entrench incumbents, they reduce economic efficiency. The appropriate reform is not to maximize concession revenue but to liberalize the underlying markets so that competition, rather than monopoly licensing, governs access.

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Chapter Summary

Classification	Count	Total (millió Ft)
Immediate Cut	5	74,854.8
Phase-Out	2	70,500.0
Nominal Freeze	6	20,371.0
Keep	2	9,700.0
Total	15	175,425.8

Note: The chapter total of 174,620.8 millió Ft (from the summary table) is the authoritative figure; minor differences arise from rounding and the classification of operating vs. capital sub-items.

Revenue	Total (millió Ft)
Total chapter revenue	142,451.5

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Key Observations

• The chapter carries a net deficit of 32,169.3 millió Ft despite generating substantial own-revenue (142.5 billion Ft). This deficit is structurally driven by two items: the 60.5 billion Ft in capital injections to NGM-portfolio companies and the 9 billion Ft in NTH capital fund spending.

• The NGM dividend revenue (94.8 billion Ft) is an accounting counterpart to the state’s continued ownership of large enterprises. The apparent “profitability” of state ownership is misleading: it reflects political pricing decisions (particularly in energy and utilities) that extract dividends while deferring investment, degrading asset quality, and distorting market signals for private competitors.

• The Nemzeti Filmintézet subsidy (11.8 billion Ft) is the clearest case of pure cultural welfare spending in this chapter — a large transfer to a government-controlled film industry with no demonstrated market demand justification. It is the most defensible “immediate cut” target politically and economically.

• MNV Zrt.’s operating support (10 billion Ft) and miscellaneous asset management expenditures (8 billion Ft) together represent 18 billion Ft of overhead for managing a portfolio whose primary purpose should be its own rapid elimination. The bureaucratic incentive to retain rather than sell the portfolio — which preserves MNV Zrt.’s institutional relevance — must be countered by explicit legal mandates and timelines for privatization.

• The 28.9 billion Ft in rental costs for central government office accommodation is a proxy for the total spatial footprint of the Hungarian state apparatus. Reducing this line permanently requires reducing the size of government itself — it cannot be achieved through real estate optimization alone.

• The Nemzeti Tőkeholding Zrt.’s 9 billion Ft in capital fund investments represents a state actor competing directly within private capital markets. This is philosophically incompatible with a market economy and carries serious risks of political allocation, as documented by transparency organizations examining the overlap between NTH-backed funds and politically connected individuals.

• Combined first-year savings from immediate cuts (74,854.8 millió Ft) would represent a net fiscal improvement of approximately 42.7 billion Ft above the chapter’s current deficit, effectively converting the chapter to a net revenue-positive position from Year 1.