The statistics office pays for its own field work twice — once in-house, once to a company it wholly owns.

Indoklás

STATEK (Statisztikai Elemző Központ Kft.) is a 100%-state-owned limited-liability company over which the KSH president exercises the ownership rights. It was created by the 2013 amendment to the Statistics Act, and it performs, on the KSH's behalf and to the KSH's professional instruction, the data-collection, data-processing, and data-publication tasks attached to the statistical function — it operates the nationwide network of field enumerators (összeírói hálózat) through which the census and the recurring surveys are conducted. This is the line where the chapter's structure earns its analysis. The function STATEK performs — field data collection for official statistics — is not a discretionary or peripheral activity. It is the heart of what a statistics office does, and on the analytical frame it belongs in the Keep category as part of the rule-of-law measurement infrastructure. The question is not the function. The question is the *form*: why the field data collection for the national statistics office is performed by a separate limited-liability company, financed by a 1,544.4 millió Ft transfer rather than carried on the office's own budget. The KSH already runs an enumeration payroll — that is the most straightforward reading of the 14.7% employer-contribution ratio on its personnel line, a ratio depressed below the statutory employer charge by a workforce with a large fee-paid and short-engagement field component. So the budget funds field data collection twice: once inside the KSH's own personnel line, and again through a transfer to a wholly-owned company that does the same kind of work. A state-owned company performing a function the parent body could perform directly, financed by a transfer rather than by a fee its users pay, is a structure that should be named for what it is. It is not an enterprise: STATEK faces no consumer plebiscite, earns no revenue from voluntary buyers, and survives on the transfer, not on whether anyone chooses to buy its output. It is not a bureaucracy on honest accounting either: it carries the legal form, governance, and management overhead of a company. It is the hybrid — a state body run in a corporate shell — and the hybrid's characteristic cost is the duplication: a separate set of accounts, a managing director, a supervisory board, a corporate administrative layer, all funded by the taxpayer for a function that is an integral part of the office next door. The reform is not to abolish field data collection. It is to dissolve the corporate shell and return the function to the KSH. The 3-year horizon reflects the genuine transition: STATEK's field enumerators and data staff are the protected party, and their work — the surveys, the census-cycle data collection — must continue without interruption while the staff are absorbed onto the KSH's own establishment. The saving is not the whole 1,544.4 millió Ft; the saving is the corporate-shell overhead — the duplicated governance, accounting, and management layer — while the enumeration payroll and the genuine field-survey operating cost migrate onto the KSH line, where they are kept. The chapter's tables do not break the STATEK transfer into its payroll and overhead components, so the precise saving cannot be computed from the budget data alone; it should be established by reading STATEK's own accounts during the first transition year. The structural point stands without the precise figure: a wholly-owned state company doing the parent office's core work is an organisational form that adds a cost layer without adding a capacity, and the reform consolidates rather than cuts.