GYED: the childcare benefit that pays a multiple more to higher earners — funded by all.

Indoklás

GYED is the largest single cash line in the chapter — larger than táppénz, larger than the rokkantsági block — and it carries the earnings-replacement defect in its sharpest form. The benefit is set at 70% of the parent's prior gross income, subject to a statutory ceiling; from 1 January 2026 the maximum monthly amount is a gross 451,920 Ft. It is drawn for an extended period — up to the child's second birthday — which makes it the largest per-recipient liability of the three earnings-scaled lines. The multi-tier arithmetic makes the within-class transfer concrete. A parent who earned the minimum wage before the birth draws GYED at 70% of that minimum wage. A parent who earned at or above the ceiling draws the capped maximum — a gross 451,920 Ft a month. The two benefits differ by a wide multiple, per month, for the full run to the child's second birthday. Both are funded from the same flat-rate contribution levied on every insured wage, including the minimum-wage parent's. The minimum-wage contributor is funding, in part, the supplement that scales with the ceiling-level earner's salary. The universalist framing — "GYED supports every working parent" — describes the coverage and conceals the distribution: coverage is universal, the benefit is earnings-scaled, and an earnings-scaled benefit paid from a flat pooled levy transfers, on net, from lower earners to higher earners. This is the same financing pathology that runs through the supplementary pension supplement, the family tax credit, and every other line where a benefit scales with prior earnings while the funding is pooled — and it is worth naming the mechanism plainly because mainstream discourse, governing and opposition alike, debates GYED as a question of generosity (is the ceiling high enough, is the duration long enough) and almost never as a question of who funds whom. The reform answers the second question: fund the benefit from the recipient's own prior contributions, and the regressive cross-subsidy disappears without the income-protection function being touched.