Public Prosecution Service

Criminal prosecution is among the most constitutionally defensible claims on public resources: protection of persons and property through law enforcement. Hungary's Prosecution Service had 153 unfilled positions and 162 prosecutors approaching mandatory retirement age by end 2023 — a shortage severe enough to prompt a constitutional amendment raising the mandatory retirement age to 70. A conviction rate of 99.2% in 2023 indicates operational competence, not excess. The reform lever is governance architecture, not headcount reduction.

Employer social contributions are a statutory consequence of the 4,208-strong workforce — 1,864 prosecutors, junior prosecutors, trainees, and support staff — and move in lockstep with the personnel line at the prevailing szociális hozzájárulási adó rate. No independent reform lever exists here. The Keep classification on personnel automatically governs this item. Any future change to staffing levels would correspondingly change this line; no separate intervention is warranted.

Running costs for 141 prosecution offices across four tiers — 5 appellate, 21 regional, 115 district — represent the necessary overhead of a geographically distributed national institution. At 5.0% of total expenditure, operating costs appear proportionate to the scale of the estate. Rationalisation of the office network over time would reduce this organically; a top-down budget cut to goods and services is not the appropriate instrument and would impair district-level prosecution disproportionately.

Renovation of existing premises across a 141-office estate. Some renovation is a legitimate maintenance obligation; the public-choice concern is that without transparent procurement data and an independent estate audit, the renovation pipeline is opaque. A nominal freeze at 1,872.0 millió Ft holds costs flat while a programmatic property review — with a view to consolidating district offices where caseload does not justify standalone premises — could generate real savings over a 5–7 year horizon.

New capital investment in prosecution infrastructure, held at a nominal freeze in the absence of a documented multi-year capital plan or independent value-for-money assessment. There is no classical-liberal case for expanding physical prosecution infrastructure beyond maintenance-level need, particularly before governance reforms addressing the service's accountability deficit are enacted. Inflation will apply real downward pressure at the frozen nominal level without requiring a legislative cut.

A residual capital line of 70.0 millió Ft — 0.07% of total expenditure. No granular information is available on what this covers from the budget document. A nominal freeze is the proportionate default: it prevents growth without imposing an arbitrary cut on capital items whose purpose is not publicly documented. Real-terms erosion through inflation reduces the allocation gradually without legislative intervention.

A chapter-managed reserve of 30.0 millió Ft funds legally binding compensation awards against the prosecution service — damages owed to citizens whose prosecutorial treatment courts have found to be wrongful. Payment of court-ordered damages is a constitutional obligation under Article XXIV of the Fundamental Law and cannot be reclassified or reduced. Accountability reforms reducing wrongful prosecution would reduce future liability organically; underfunding the reserve does not.

A residual operating line of 6.8 millió Ft — 0.007% of total expenditure. At this magnitude no independent analytical question arises and no meaningful reform signal exists. Administrative review of this line would cost more than any saving it could generate. Keep is the only proportionate response to an item of this scale within a constitutionally mandated institution.