Chapter X: Igazságügyi Minisztérium (Ministry of Justice)

Overview

Chapter X covers the institutional budget of Hungary’s Ministry of Justice (Igazságügyi Minisztérium, IM) for 2026. The chapter encompasses three titles: the central administration of the ministry itself (Title 1), the Mádl Ferenc Összehasonlító Jogi Intézet (Mádl Ferenc Institute of Comparative Law, Title 2), and a large block of chapter-managed appropriations (Fejezeti kezelésű előirányzatok, Title 20) covering legal aid, victim compensation, animal welfare grants, registry systems, and a substantial capital modernization programme.

Total expenditure: 39,821.0 millió Ft
Total operating expenditure (Működési kiadás): 21,217.9 millió Ft
Total capital expenditure (Felhalmozási kiadás): 18,603.1 millió Ft
Total own revenue (Bevétel): 150.0 millió Ft
Net cost to the budget: 39,671.0 millió Ft

The chapter is notable for two competing elements: a set of functions that are broadly consistent with the night-watchman state (court-adjacent compensation payments, legal aid for indigent defendants, and justice IT infrastructure), alongside items that are clearly outside that framework (a comparative law research institute, animal welfare grant programmes, and legal education subsidies).

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Expenditure Analysis

Title 1: Igazságügyi Minisztérium igazgatása (Ministry of Justice Administration)

Subtotal operating expenditure: 12,460.2 millió Ft
Subtotal capital expenditure: 20.1 millió Ft
Total: 12,480.3 millió Ft

Személyi juttatások (Personnel Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 6,458.1 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: The Ministry of Justice itself is a core state institution: it oversees the legal framework, manages justice-sector regulatory functions, and coordinates court-adjacent services. Under a night-watchman framework, a justice ministry retains legitimate existence. However, the current personnel budget implies substantial staffing beyond the minimal core required for rule-of-law functions. Wage growth should be contained in real terms; a nominal freeze eliminates further expansion while allowing attrition to reduce headcount over time.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal wage envelope at the 2026 level. Any new hires require approval only to replace departing staff in core functions (legislation, justice administration). Non-core staff (policy research, public communications, EU programming) should not be replaced upon departure. After 5 years, reassess headcount and target a 20% reduction.
• Affected groups: Ministry civil servants and political appointees. Attrition-based reductions affect employment prospects of graduates entering the public service.

Munkaadókat terhelő járulékok és szociális hozzájárulási adó (Employer Contributions and Social Contribution Tax)

• Current allocation: 812.9 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This is the mandatory social contribution payable on the personnel budget. Its trajectory follows headcount and wages directly. A nominal freeze on the wage bill automatically constrains this line, making it unnecessary to treat separately; the classification mirrors the personnel line.
• Transition mechanism: Follows the personnel freeze. Any reduction in headcount will proportionally reduce this line.
• Affected groups: Same as above; the tax incidence ultimately falls on employees in the form of lower net wages.

Dologi kiadások (Goods and Services Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 5,189.2 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: Operating costs of a ministry of this scale are difficult to cut sharply without impairing core functions. The amount is, however, notably high relative to personnel costs — suggesting discretionary spending, outsourced contracts, and IT services that may well exceed the efficient minimum. A nominal freeze ensures no real expansion while market competition and procurement reform can erode unit costs over time.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze at the 2026 nominal level. Subject all contracts above 50 millió Ft to competitive re-tendering. Introduce unit-cost benchmarks against comparable EU justice ministries. Real-terms erosion at 2.5% annual inflation implies an approximately 22% real reduction over 10 years.
• Affected groups: Contractors, IT vendors, and office-service suppliers to the ministry. Minimal impact on citizens directly.

Beruházások (Capital Investments)

• Current allocation: 10.1 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: Minimal capital expenditure for the core ministry building and IT infrastructure. This is within the range expected for maintaining the physical capacity of a legitimate state institution.
• Transition mechanism: No change required. Subject to ordinary procurement rules.
• Affected groups: Facilities management contractors.

Egyéb felhalmozási célú kiadások (Other Capital Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 10.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: Negligible amount. Likely covers equipment purchases or minor capital grants. No material reform priority at this scale.
• Transition mechanism: No change required.
• Affected groups: Minimal.

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Title 2: Mádl Ferenc Összehasonlító Jogi Intézet (Mádl Ferenc Institute of Comparative Law)

Total operating expenditure: 921.4 millió Ft
Total capital expenditure: 6.4 millió Ft
Grand total: 927.8 millió Ft

Established in 2019 under the Ministry of Justice, the Mádl Ferenc Institute of Comparative Law (MFI) conducts comparative legal research to support the legislative process and promotes Hungary’s legal traditions internationally. While it is named after a former president and academic, it is a state-funded research body operating under ministerial authority.

Személyi juttatások (Personnel Expenditures)

• Current allocation: 726.9 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (3 years)
• Rationale: State-funded comparative legal research is not a function of the night-watchman state. Legislative drafting assistance does not require a dedicated state institute — private law firms, university faculties, and bar associations can supply legal research on a contract basis. The Mises calculation problem applies directly: absent price signals, there is no way to verify that the research produced by a captive government institute corresponds to socially valued knowledge rather than politically directed output. The institution is of modest size (circa 927.8 millió Ft total), making a relatively swift phase-out practical.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1 — reduce operating grant by 33%, freeze new hires. Year 2 — reduce by a further 33%, actively place researchers with universities or private research centres. Year 3 — full termination, transfer any public-domain legal databases to the National Archives or open-access platforms. Staff on civil service contracts protected by Labour Code provisions receive statutory redundancy payments.
• Affected groups: Approximately 50-80 researchers and support staff based on the wage budget. Legal academics who may lose a research platform. Impact is contained and manageable given the small scale.

Munkaadókat terhelő járulékok és szociális hozzájárulási adó

• Current allocation: 100.6 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (3 years)
• Rationale: Follows the personnel phase-out.
• Transition mechanism: Declines proportionally as headcount is reduced.
• Affected groups: Same as above.

Dologi kiadások

• Current allocation: 93.9 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (3 years)
• Rationale: Research operating costs (library access, publications, conferences) decline as the institute winds down.
• Transition mechanism: Reduce proportionally each year.
• Affected groups: Research suppliers and publishers.

Beruházások (Capital Investments)

• Current allocation: 6.4 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: No new capital investment should be made in an institution scheduled for termination. Committing capital to an organisation being wound down locks resources into a depreciating asset with no recovery value consistent with the programme’s elimination.
• Transition mechanism: Cancel immediately. No new IT systems or building works to be commissioned.
• Affected groups: IT vendors. No citizen impact.

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Title 20: Fejezeti kezelésű előirányzatok (Chapter-Managed Appropriations)

This title contains the discretionary and statutory grant programmes managed directly by the Ministry of Justice.

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Sub-title 1: IM szakmai programok és egyéb kötelezettségek támogatása (IM Professional Programmes and Other Commitments)

IM felügyelete alá tartozó szervezetek és szakmai programok támogatása (Support for Organisations under IM Supervision and Professional Programmes)

• Current allocation: 169.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (2 years)
• Rationale: This line funds various organisations under the ministry’s oversight and professionally designated programmes. Without a breakdown of recipient organisations it is impossible to determine whether each serves a core justice function. Absent more granular justification, the precautionary principle of Austrian budget analysis applies: discretionary transfers to quasi-governmental entities lack the competitive discipline needed to ensure efficient use. Some subset may serve genuine administrative functions (e.g., registry authorities), but the bulk reflects the typical pattern of captured-budget transfers that persist through bureaucratic inertia. A two-year phase-out allows legitimate activities to be absorbed into line-item budgets where they can be individually justified, while eliminating the grant-conduit architecture.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1 — require each recipient to submit a justification tied to specific night-watchman-compatible functions; cut funding to those that cannot. Year 2 — terminate remaining grants; absorb any surviving legitimate functions into direct expenditure lines.
• Affected groups: Supervised organisations receiving grants. Their clients, if services are discontinued.

A jogászképzés színvonalának emelését célzó programok támogatása (Support for Programmes to Improve the Quality of Legal Education)

• Current allocation: 332.2 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: Legal education is a private good. Law graduates capture the earnings premium from their qualifications directly. State subsidy of law school quality improvement programmes is a transfer to future high-income earners and to the legal profession as a cartel. The subjective-value principle is violated: taxpayers are compelled to fund a product (legal graduates) whose value is privately internalised by the recipients. In addition, state involvement in professional education quality introduces central planners into decisions that markets and professional associations — bar exams, academic rankings, student choice — already handle through distributed information. This is a textbook case of Bastiat’s seen-and-unseen: the seen is marginally better law school programmes; the unseen is the private legal education market that would have developed (and in many countries has developed) without subsidy.
• Transition mechanism: Remove the appropriation in the 2027 budget. Law faculties and bar associations are able to source quality improvement funding from tuition, research grants, and private endowments.
• Affected groups: Law faculties at public universities; law students who benefit from improved course quality. The broader professional association (Magyar Ügyvédi Kamara) has independent resources to fund bar-standard improvement.

Igazságszolgáltatási szervek részvétele a jogszabályelőkészítésben (Participation of Judicial Bodies in Legislative Drafting)

• Current allocation: 195.2 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This appropriation funds the participation of courts and judicial bodies in the legislative drafting process — providing technical legal expertise to legislators preparing new statutes. This function is directly consistent with the night-watchman framework: it ensures that laws affecting the administration of justice are technically sound before enactment, reducing costly legal uncertainty and future litigation. Austrian economics has no objection to the state paying for the internal coordination costs of its own minimal legitimate functions.
• Transition mechanism: No change. Subject to ordinary value-for-money audit to ensure the funds go to direct drafting work rather than conferences and publications.
• Affected groups: Judges and court officials involved in legislative consultations. Indirect benefit to all parties whose disputes are governed by the resulting statutes.

Nemzetközi kötelezettségek teljesítése (Fulfilment of International Obligations)

• Current allocation: 45.9 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This covers Hungary’s treaty-based financial contributions to international legal bodies (e.g., the Council of Europe, UNCITRAL, Hague Conference on Private International Law). Membership in treaty organisations that establish the international rule of law and property rights frameworks is consistent with a minimal state’s foreign policy. The amount is modest.
• Transition mechanism: No change. Subject to periodic review: any contribution to an organisation engaged in activism beyond rule-of-law functions should be reconsidered.
• Affected groups: International legal organisations. Indirect benefit to Hungarian nationals with cross-border disputes.

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Sub-title 2: Igazságügyi miniszter feladatkörébe tartozó jogszabályok alapján teljesítendő fizetési kötelezettségek (Statutory Payment Obligations Under the Minister of Justice’s Remit)

These are primarily mandatory transfers required under specific statutes — the most legitimate category of discretionary spending, as they represent the state fulfilling legal obligations created by its own courts and laws.

A büntetőeljárásról szóló törvény alapján megállapított kártalanítás (Compensation Under the Code of Criminal Procedure)

• Current allocation: 150.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This funds compensation payments to individuals who have been unlawfully detained, wrongfully convicted, or otherwise harmed by procedural failures of the criminal justice system. From an Austrian perspective this is one of the most legitimate expenditure items in the entire budget: it is the state making individuals whole for violations of their liberty and property rights caused by state action. Restitution for wrongful state action is not only consistent with the night-watchman framework — it is required by it. Per Rothbard, the state must compensate those it harms in the exercise of its functions.
• Transition mechanism: No change. This line should, if anything, be protected against cuts. Any reduction would signal impunity for wrongful prosecution.
• Affected groups: Persons wrongfully detained or convicted. Families of affected individuals.

Jogi segítségnyújtás (Legal Aid)

• Current allocation: 365.7 millió Ft
• Classification: Phase-Out (5 years)
• Rationale: State-provided legal aid (established under the 2003. évi LXXX. törvény) finances legal advice and representation for low-income individuals in civil proceedings. The Austrian case against this programme is not that access to justice is unimportant, but that state provision crowds out voluntary and market alternatives: pro bono obligations of bar members, legal expense insurance, contingency-fee arrangements, and charitable legal clinics. The state legal aid infrastructure also creates a bureaucratic intermediary (the Igazságügyi Hivatal) whose operating costs absorb resources that could go directly to legal services. Phase-out over five years allows the voluntary and insurance market to develop substitutes. The more rapid the phase-out of other distortionary regulations that suppress contingency-fee markets, the shorter the transition needed here.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1-2 — introduce means-testing stringency and reduce the income ceiling for eligibility, reducing caseload by an estimated 30%. Year 3-4 — open the market to private legal expense insurance; allow bar associations to fulfil pro bono obligations in lieu of fees. Year 5 — terminate state programme; any residual demand for criminal-case legal aid (where liberty is at stake) transitions to the kirendelt védő (appointed defence counsel) line which is separately funded and arguably more legitimate. Emergency charitable legal clinics may receive tax deductibility for private donations.
• Affected groups: Low-income civil litigants. Lawyers currently providing legal aid services under state contracts. The transition period gives time for private arrangements to develop.

Bűncselekmények áldozatainak kárenyhítése (Victim Compensation for Crime Victims)

• Current allocation: 308.8 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: Hungary’s 2005. évi CXXXV. törvény established a state victim assistance and compensation scheme for victims of violent crime. From a libertarian and Austrian perspective, this is a borderline case: ideally, compensation should come from the perpetrator (restitutive justice) rather than general taxation. However, given that perpetrators are often unable to pay and that the state maintains a monopoly on prosecution that removes the victim’s ability to seek private restitution, a transitional state compensation programme is defensible as a second-best outcome. The Áldozatsegítő Szolgálat (Victim Assistance Service) centres also provide trauma counselling and coordination with social services, which in a night-watchman transition would be funded privately. Keep for now; flag for review as private restitution mechanisms and voluntary charitable support develop.
• Transition mechanism: Maintain at current level. Over time, strengthen perpetrator restitution orders in criminal sentencing so that state compensation becomes a last-resort backstop rather than the primary channel.
• Affected groups: Victims of violent crime seeking financial assistance. A politically sensitive line whose reduction without private alternatives in place would be harmful.

Magán- és egyéb jogi személyek kártalanítása (Compensation for Private and Other Legal Persons)

• Current allocation: 2,544.5 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This is the largest single item in the statutory payments sub-title. It covers state compensation payments to companies, NGOs, and other legal persons for unlawful state action — whether through wrongful regulatory decisions, expropriation without due process, or administrative error resulting in financial loss. This is the most Austrian-compatible expenditure item in the chapter: it is the state being held financially accountable for violations of property rights. A robust compensation mechanism for legal persons is an essential discipline on arbitrary government action. Cutting this line would increase state impunity.
• Transition mechanism: No reduction. To the contrary, strengthening and accelerating the adjudication of these claims would improve the rule of law. Review whether the 2,544.5 millió Ft allocation is adequate relative to outstanding claims.
• Affected groups: Businesses and non-profit organisations with outstanding claims against the state. The allocation also has an indirect deterrent effect on arbitrary administrative action.

Az alapvető jogokat sértő elhelyezési körülmények miatti kártalanítás (Compensation for Detention Conditions Violating Fundamental Rights)

• Current allocation: 100.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This line compensates prisoners held in conditions found by courts to violate fundamental rights (e.g., severe overcrowding, inadequate sanitation). Under the 2016 amendment to the criminal enforcement law following adverse European Court of Human Rights rulings, detainees may claim compensation from the state. From an Austrian standpoint, this is restitution for state violence — exactly the type of liability that should attach to government when it operates prisons. Cutting this line would signal that the state need not be accountable for the conditions it imposes on detainees, which is incompatible with the rule of law even under the most minimal state conception.
• Transition mechanism: No change. The root cost driver is prison overcrowding — reducing unnecessary incarceration (e.g., for victimless offences) would organically reduce this liability.
• Affected groups: Current and former detainees who were held in substandard conditions.

Kirendelt védői díjak kifizetése (Appointed Defence Counsel Fees)

• Current allocation: 725.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: This funds fees paid to attorneys appointed by courts to represent defendants who cannot afford private counsel in criminal proceedings. The right to legal representation in criminal proceedings where liberty is at stake is a foundational rule-of-law requirement. In Misesian terms, the state’s monopoly on criminal prosecution creates an asymmetry of power that obligates it to ensure that defendants have competent representation. Appointed defence is not welfare — it is a structural requirement of a fair trial, without which criminal convictions lack legitimacy.
• Transition mechanism: No change to the overall programme. Subject the fee schedule to market review to ensure it is set at competitive rates that attract competent attorneys, rather than being set administratively below market, which would degrade quality.
• Affected groups: Criminal defendants without means for private representation. Attorneys on the appointed defence panel.

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Sub-title 3: Az állatvédelemmel kapcsolatos feladatok támogatása (Support for Animal Welfare Tasks)

• Current allocation: 2,750.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: This is the most straightforward immediate cut in the chapter. Animal welfare grant programmes — administered through the Bethlen Gabor Foundation and channelled to civil organisations and shelters — are not a function of the minimal state. Animal welfare is a private good with strong voluntary market provision: shelters funded by donations, veterinary charities, and citizen-driven rescue networks operate in every developed country without state subsidy. The compulsory transfer of resources from taxpayers (who may not share this preference) to animal welfare organisations violates the subjective value principle at the heart of Austrian economics. Per Bastiat: the seen is supported animal shelters; the unseen is the private charitable activity that would have developed had taxpayers kept this 2,750.0 millió Ft and donated it (or not) according to their own preferences. The amount is substantial — the second-largest single item in the chapter-managed block.
• Transition mechanism: Terminate the appropriation in the 2027 budget. Animal welfare organisations can seek private donations, membership fees, and foundation grants. The government should simultaneously remove any regulatory barriers to private fundraising by these organisations.
• Affected groups: Animal welfare civil organisations, approximately 50-100 recipient groups based on typical grant programme structures. Dogs and cats in shelters currently subsidised by the state — this is a genuine near-term welfare cost that voluntary donations should partially offset. Shelter staff employed under state-funded programmes.

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Sub-title 4: A jogi személyek egységes nyilvántartásával kapcsolatos feladatok támogatása (Support for the Unified Registry of Legal Persons)

• Current allocation: 150.0 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Keep
• Rationale: The unified registry of legal persons (companies, associations, foundations) is a public good in the narrow economic sense: it is the foundational property-rights infrastructure that allows market participants to identify legal counterparties, verify ownership, and enforce contracts. A reliable company and entity registry is indispensable to the functioning of voluntary exchange and the rule of law. Austrian economics has no objection to state provision of the infrastructure that underpins the legal framework of property and contract.
• Transition mechanism: No change to funding. Subject to efficiency review: explore whether registry services could be operated on a full cost-recovery basis (fees charged to registrants) to reduce the net budgetary cost. In the long run, user fees on commercial registrations can make this line self-financing.
• Affected groups: All legal persons registered in Hungary. The business community broadly.

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Sub-title 5: Az igazságügyi modernizációval összefüggő intézkedések (Measures Related to Justice Modernisation)

• Current allocation: 18,576.6 millió Ft (capital)
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: This is the largest single line in the chapter, representing 46.6% of total expenditure. It is a capital appropriation for justice-sector IT and infrastructure modernisation — digitalisation of courts, case management systems, electronic filing, and related investments. The classification is nuanced. On one hand, modernising the information infrastructure of the court system is fully consistent with the night-watchman framework: efficient courts protect property rights and enforce contracts, and digital systems reduce the time and cost of justice for all parties. On the other hand, 18,576.6 millió Ft in a single year for a justice ministry of Hungary’s scale is an unusually large capital allocation, suggesting the programme may include projects beyond the core modernisation mandate or be front-loaded to absorb EU co-financing windows. Without a detailed project-by-project breakdown, the precautionary classification is a nominal freeze — approve what is already planned, but allow no new additions to the programme at this scale.
• Transition mechanism: Conduct an immediate project audit. Identify which sub-projects directly improve court efficiency and contract-enforcement speed; keep those. Identify which are peripheral (e.g., branding, communications systems, non-court ministry IT) and defer or cancel them. Over time, model this as a declining capital envelope as the core modernisation is completed, transitioning to a maintenance budget.
• Affected groups: Court users (businesses and citizens), who benefit from faster and cheaper dispute resolution. IT vendors and systems integrators with existing contracts. Ministry staff involved in managing the programme.

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Revenue Items

Hazai működési bevétel (Domestic Operating Revenue)

• Name: Hazai működési bevétel (Domestic Operating Revenue)
• Current yield: 150.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / administrative charge
• Notes: The 150.0 millió Ft of operating revenue is attributed to Title 1 (Ministry Administration). It most likely represents administrative fees charged for official services — document certification, apostille services, legal entity registration charges, or other ministerial services for which a fee is set by regulation. This revenue line is small relative to expenditure (0.4% of total chapter cost). If the Ministry’s administrative functions are restructured or if registry services (Sub-title 4) are commercialised further, this revenue could grow. Crucially, this fee income disappears if the ministry is significantly downsized, but the ministry itself is retained in the night-watchman framework.

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Chapter Summary

Classification	Count	Total (millió Ft)
Immediate Cut	3	3,088.6
Phase-Out	6	2,278.5
Nominal Freeze	4	29,821.9
Keep	10	4,482.0
Total	23	39,671.0

Note: The above totals reflect net expenditure (excluding the 150.0 millió Ft revenue offset). The Keep total includes statutory compensation lines (150.0 + 2,544.5 + 308.8 + 100.0 + 725.0), the judicial drafting line (195.2), international obligations (45.9), the registry capital line (150.0), and appointed defence counsel fees (725.0).

Revenue	Total (millió Ft)
Total chapter revenue	150.0

Year 1 savings (Immediate Cut items): 3,088.6 millió Ft
Full realised savings at phase-out completion: 2,278.5 millió Ft (additional, once phase-outs complete)
10-year real erosion on Nominal Freeze items (at 2.5% avg inflation): approximately 7,236.4 millió Ft in real terms

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Key Observations

• The chapter is bifurcated: roughly half the expenditure (the statutory compensation payments and court-related items) is entirely consistent with the night-watchman state, while the other half (the Mádl Institute, animal welfare grants, legal education subsidies, and the large modernisation capital block) contains items whose legitimacy under an Austrian framework is debatable or absent.

• The single most consequential line is the Igazságügyi modernizációval összefüggő intézkedések at 18,576.6 millió Ft. This is nearly half the chapter’s total budget. Without a project-level breakdown it is impossible to classify it precisely; a nominal freeze is the appropriate precautionary stance pending an audit.

• The Magán- és egyéb jogi személyek kártalanítása (2,544.5 millió Ft) is an underappreciated item. It represents the largest single operating expenditure in the chapter-managed block, and it reflects the accumulated cost of unlawful state action against businesses. Austrian economists should treat this not merely as a spending line but as a proxy measure of government-caused economic damage — a figure that should be driving reform of administrative law, not just budget management.

• The animal welfare programme (2,750.0 millió Ft) is the most anomalous item relative to the ministry’s core mandate. Its placement in the Ministry of Justice budget — rather than the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of the Interior — reflects the ad hoc accretion of functions to ministries that is typical of corporatist budget structures, and reinforces the case for a systematic review of ministry portfolios.

• The Mádl Ferenc Összehasonlító Jogi Intézet represents a classic Austrian calculation problem. At 927.8 millió Ft per year, the institute produces comparative legal research that is indistinguishable in its incentive structure from political advocacy: its output supports the legislative agenda of the government that funds it, and its researchers have no market test to validate the social value of their work. This is precisely the type of institution where the knowledge problem (Hayek) manifests most acutely.

• Revenue self-sufficiency is almost nil (0.4%). The chapter is effectively 99.6% taxpayer-funded. Introducing user fees for commercially separable services — registry functions, apostille services, some legal aid — could meaningfully reduce the net budgetary cost without impairing access to justice for those genuinely unable to pay.

• Appointed defence counsel fees (725.0 millió Ft) are at risk of being administratively set below market rates, creating a systematic quality deficit in criminal defence. This is a structural problem that money alone cannot fix; reform of the fee schedule and audit of actual quality of representation is needed alongside budget continuity.