Chapter I: Országgyűlés (National Assembly)

Overview

Chapter I encompasses the budgetary appropriations for Hungary’s National Assembly (Országgyűlés) and all institutions under its jurisdiction. This includes the Assembly’s own administrative apparatus, the Parliamentary Guard, several independent regulatory and supervisory bodies, the National Electoral Office, public media financing, and political party and party foundation subsidies.

Total expenditure for 2026: 348,192.3 millió Ft (operating: 324,862.9; capital: 23,329.4) Total own revenue: 27,060.3 millió Ft Net budgetary draw: 321,132.0 millió Ft

The chapter is dominated by three large items: public media contribution (141,268.4 millió Ft), the National Assembly’s own administrative apparatus (approx. 99,251.0 millió Ft in the aggregated cím 1-4 block), and the National Electoral Office including the 2026 parliamentary election (32,772.8 millió Ft). The remaining institutions are comparatively small regulatory bodies largely self-funded through industry levies.

---

Expenditure Analysis

Cím 1/1: Országgyűlés Hivatali Szervei (Administrative Bodies of the National Assembly)

• Current allocation: 85,449.5 millió Ft (operating: Személyi juttatások 61,256.9 + Járulékok 7,081.1 + Dologi kiadások 12,678.6 + Ellátottak juttatásai 373.2 + Egyéb 60.0 = 81,449.8; capital: Beruházások 2,338.7 + Felújítások 1,755.7 = 4,094.4); own revenue: 2,510.0
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: A functioning legislature is indispensable even in the minimal night-watchman framework — legislation, scrutiny of the executive, and ratification of the state budget require an administrative body. However, the scale of this apparatus (over 61 billion forint in salaries alone) is inconsistent with a lean legislative secretariat. From a Misesian perspective, the state cannot know the optimal staffing level better than a market signal would reveal; the absence of competitive pressure means persistent over-staffing. A nominal freeze disciplines future growth without triggering a legislative crisis.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze the nominal allocation at the 2026 level. No new positions to be created; natural attrition to reduce headcount over 3-5 years. Capital spending (investments and renovations beyond maintenance) to be separately reviewed each cycle.
• Affected groups: Assembly staff and parliamentary employees. Members of parliament are not directly affected; their emoluments appear within this block and must be distinguished from administrative overhead in future reform work.

Cím 2: Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára — ÁBTL (Historical Archive of the State Security Services)

• Current allocation: 2,147.8 millió Ft (operating: Személyi juttatások 1,156.4 + Járulékok 170.0 + Dologi kiadások 606.2 = 1,932.6; capital: Beruházások 198.0 + Felújítások 17.2 = 215.2); own revenue: 5.0
• Classification: Phase-Out (5 years)
• Rationale: The ÁBTL preserves and manages the records of Hungary’s former communist-era secret police apparatus and provides access for citizens to their own files. While access to personal records is a genuine property-rights-adjacent concern (individuals have a legitimate claim to see information held about them by the state), the ongoing institutional structure — with a large permanent staff, an exhibition function, and an academic research mission — extends well beyond this core task. The archival function could be transferred to the National Archives (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár) at substantially lower cost; digital access to files eliminates the need for a separate venue and public exhibition. The cultural-ideological commemoration function is not a legitimate state activity.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1-2: Transfer all irat (document) custody to Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár; digitize remaining paper records. Year 3-4: Redirect individual access requests to the National Archives’ unified platform; redeploy or separate staff. Year 5: Close as independent institution; dissolve or transfer residual obligations.
• Affected groups: Approximately 100-150 ÁBTL staff. Citizens seeking access to communist-era personal files (access guaranteed via MNL transition). Researchers studying the communist security apparatus.

Cím 3: Országgyűlési Őrség (Parliamentary Guard)

• Current allocation: 6,246.3 millió Ft (Személyi juttatások 5,525.0 + Járulékok 721.3)
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: Physical security of the seat of government falls within the legitimate night-watchman function (protection of persons and property). However, the Országgyűlési Őrség is a uniformed armed body numbering in the hundreds, with salary costs exceeding 5.5 billion forint — a very large security apparatus for a single building and its environs. A nominal freeze prevents further expansion while natural attrition reduces the real cost burden. The question of whether full-service proprietary guard services could replace portions of this function (using private security contractors at competitive cost) should be evaluated separately.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation. Commission an independent efficiency review comparing per-officer cost against comparable parliamentary security bodies in neighbouring states. Gradually transfer non-core ceremonial functions to a smaller ceremonial unit or eliminate them.
• Affected groups: Parliamentary Guard officers and support staff (~500-700 personnel estimated from salary mass).

Cím 4/3: Az Országgyűlés Elnökének Közcélú Felajánlásai, Adományai (Speaker’s Public Donations and Charitable Contributions)

• Current allocation: 100.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: This line item represents state funds channelled through the Speaker of the National Assembly to unspecified charitable or public-purpose recipients at the Speaker’s personal discretion. There is no competitive or rule-based allocation process. From an Austrian perspective, this is arbitrary redistribution of coercively collected tax revenue, without subjective value revelation or consumer sovereignty. Private individuals and voluntary organizations can perform charitable giving without state intermediation. The seen beneficiaries (unnamed charitable recipients) are offset by the unseen cost to all taxpayers who funded this discretionary pool.
• Transition mechanism: Remove from the 2027 budget bill. No transition period required; the Speaker may personally donate private funds if desired.
• Affected groups: Current beneficiaries of the Speaker’s charitable donations — unidentified organizations. Negligible fiscal impact but high symbolic importance for the principle of non-discretionary public spending.

Cím 4/4: A Kárpát-medencei Magyar Képviselők Fóruma — KMKF (Forum of Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin) and Foundation Support

• Current allocation: 80.0 millió Ft (Magyar Nemzeti Közösségek Európai Érdekképviseletéért Alapítvány support)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The KMKF is a consultative body bringing together elected representatives of Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. Its foundation support — channelled to the Magyar Nemzeti Közösségek Európai Érdekképviseletéért Alapítvány (Foundation for European Representation of Hungarian National Communities) — finances what is essentially foreign-minority political lobbying. This is not a legitimate state function under the night-watchman framework: voluntary associations and diaspora communities may organize and advocate for themselves without state subsidy. The state has no comparative advantage in determining the representational needs of Hungarian minorities abroad, and such subsidies create dependency rather than genuine civil society capacity.
• Transition mechanism: Immediate Cut in the 2027 budget. The KMKF forum itself may continue as a political consultative forum without direct budgetary allocation if it can secure voluntary or parliamentary support from member delegations.
• Affected groups: Hungarian minority political representatives and communities in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovenia; the foundation’s staff.

Cím 4/6: Képviselő-testület Váltásával Kapcsolatos Kiadások (Costs Related to Parliamentary Turnover/Transition)

• Current allocation: 5,991.2 millió Ft (operating: 4,443.1 + capital: 1,576.1)
• Classification: Immediate Cut (one-time, 2026-specific)
• Rationale: This item covers costs related to the change of parliamentary membership following the 2026 elections — transitional allowances, severance, office relocation, and capital spending associated with outgoing and incoming MPs. While some minimum transitional provision may be defensible as a contractual obligation, the scale (nearly 6 billion forint) suggests generous ex gratia payments beyond any contractual minimum. From an Austrian perspective, these are institutional transition costs that should be minimized and one-time in nature. The classification is “Immediate Cut” in the sense that this line should not recur after the election cycle and any excess above legally mandated minimum severance should be removed.
• Transition mechanism: Cap payments at legally mandated statutory minima for departing MPs. Do not create new precedents for enhanced exit packages. Capital spending component (1,576.1 millió Ft) should be reviewed line by line; office refurbishments beyond functional necessity are not justified.
• Affected groups: Outgoing Members of Parliament; incoming MPs (setup costs); assembly administrative staff supporting the transition.

Cím 4/8: Volt Köztársasági Elnökök Közcélú Felajánlásai, Adományai (Former Presidents’ Charitable Donations — Schmitt, Áder, Novák)

• Current allocation: 219.0 millió Ft (Schmitt Pál 73.0 + Áder János 73.0 + Novák Katalin 73.0)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The state provides three former heads of state with discretionary budgets for charitable donations made in their name. This is pure political patronage: there is no market process to determine optimal charitable allocation, no accountability for recipient selection, and no reason why private citizens — even former presidents — cannot disburse private funds for charitable purposes. The seen beneficiaries (charitable recipients of the former presidents’ largesse) are small and unverifiable; the unseen cost falls on all Hungarian taxpayers.
• Transition mechanism: Remove from the 2027 budget. Former presidents retain their state pensions and security provisions; discretionary charitable funds are a supernumerary benefit.
• Affected groups: Charitable organizations currently receiving funds from the three former presidents through this mechanism.

Cím 4/14: Steindl Imre Program Támogatása (Steindl Imre Program — Parliament Building and Surroundings Renovation)

• Current allocation: 21,369.5 millió Ft (operating: 4,780.2 + capital: 16,589.3)
• Classification: Phase-Out (3 years)
• Rationale: The Steindl Imre Program is a long-running capital program renovating Hungary’s Parliament building (Országház) and redeveloping Kossuth Square and the surrounding area in central Budapest. The Parliament building itself — as the seat of the legislature, a genuine night-watchman function — requires maintenance and must not be allowed to deteriorate. However, the scope of the program extends significantly beyond structural maintenance into prestigious urban redevelopment, monument construction, and aesthetic improvements to public spaces, which are not legitimate state expenditures. The ongoing capital appropriation of 16.6 billion forint for 2026 alone is large. A phase-out forces the program to complete essential structural work and defer or cancel optional prestige components.
• Transition mechanism: Year 1 (2026): Complete contractually committed structural maintenance work. Year 2 (2027): Reduce capital appropriation by 50%; complete only safety-critical and legally mandated renovations. Year 3 (2028): Close out program; transfer ongoing maintenance to a standard facilities management budget at a fraction of current spend. Prestige and urban-beautification components to be cancelled.
• Affected groups: Construction and architectural firms holding Steindl program contracts; workers on active renovation sites; the public (delayed completion of streetscaping around Parliament).

Cím 5: Közbeszerzési Hatóság (Public Procurement Authority)

• Current allocation: 3,567.8 millió Ft (operating: 3,387.6; capital: 180.2); own revenue: 2,194.0
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: The Közbeszerzési Hatóság (KH) oversees public procurement procedures, enforces EU procurement rules, and adjudicates procurement disputes. In the Austrian framework, as long as a government sector exists that purchases goods and services with public money, some oversight mechanism is needed to constrain corruption and ensure competitive procedures. The KH generates substantial own revenue (2,194.0 millió Ft) from fees, partially offsetting its costs. The net budgetary cost is approximately 1,374 millió Ft. A nominal freeze is appropriate: the authority should not grow in nominal terms, and under a consistently shrinking state, its workload will decline as the scope of state procurement contracts falls.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation. Ensure fee revenue covers an increasing share of operating costs over time. As state expenditure falls across all chapters, the KH’s workload will naturally contract, enabling future real-terms reduction.
• Affected groups: KH staff. Businesses and contracting entities participating in public procurement procedures.

Cím 8: Pártok Támogatása (Political Party Subsidies)

• Current allocation: 2,548.8 millió Ft (parties holding national-list mandates: Fidesz 1,014.0; DK 268.6; Jobbik 236.4; Momentum 185.1; MSZP 183.3; Mi Hazánk 183.1; KDNP 160.5; Párbeszéd 135.9; LMP 105.6; parties without mandates: MKKP 54.7; Megoldás Mozgalom 21.6)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: State subsidies to political parties are a paradigmatic violation of the principle of voluntary exchange and associational freedom. Political parties are voluntary associations whose funding should come from the voluntary contributions of their members and supporters. Compulsory state subsidy of parties entrenches incumbents, creates barriers to new political entrants, and forces taxpayers to finance political activities they may oppose. The Austrian calculation problem applies directly: there is no objective method for the state to determine which parties or ideological tendencies are deserving of subsidy. The fact that state financing is distributed in proportion to electoral results merely amplifies existing advantage. This is also visible in the allocation: Fidesz, the governing party, receives 1,014.0 millió Ft — four times the allocation of the next largest party.
• Transition mechanism: Remove all party subsidies from the 2027 budget. Political parties must fund their activities through member dues, voluntary donations, fundraising events, and voluntary private contributions subject to existing transparency and donation-cap rules. Introduce or strengthen donation transparency requirements as a complementary reform.
• Affected groups: All parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political parties currently receiving public funds. Parties with weak voluntary membership bases (most parties) will face financial pressure, but this is appropriate: it tests genuine popular support.

Cím 9: Pártalapítványok Támogatása (Political Party Foundation Subsidies)

• Current allocation: 3,230.4 millió Ft (Szövetség a Polgári Magyarországért Alapítvány 1,593.9; Új Köztársaságért Alapítvány 334.3; Jobbik Magyarországért Alapítvány 279.8; Indítsuk Be Magyarországot Alapítvány 193.1; Táncsics Mihály Alapítvány 190.1; Mi Hazánk Alapítvány 189.7; Barankovics István Alapítvány 151.6; Megújuló Magyarországért Alapítvány 110.1; Ökopolisz Alapítvány 58.7; Savköpő Menyét Alapítvány 92.5; MEMO Alapítvány 36.6)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: Party foundations are the think-tank and educational arms of political parties. The same logic applying to direct party subsidies applies here, amplified: these foundations produce ideological content, conduct political education, and support party activity through research and publications. There is no legitimate basis for compelling taxpayers to fund political indoctrination, however described. The largest single beneficiary, Szövetség a Polgári Magyarországért Alapítvány (Alliance for a Civic Hungary Foundation, associated with Fidesz), receives 1,593.9 millió Ft — nearly half the total for all foundations combined, and more than the entire direct subsidy to all opposition parties. This represents a significant and distortionary advantage to the incumbent political force.
• Transition mechanism: Remove all party foundation subsidies from the 2027 budget. Foundations that produce genuinely valuable research or civic education may seek private funding from members, donors, and civil society grants. No transition period is required; foundations are not providing essential public services that would collapse without state funding.
• Affected groups: Staff of all eleven party foundations (est. 200-400 employees across all institutions). The political parties themselves lose an indirect funding channel.

Cím 10: Kampányköltségek (Election Campaign Costs Reimbursement)

• Current allocation: 4,000.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The state reimburses political parties for their campaign expenses. Campaign spending is a voluntary expenditure decision made by each party; there is no economic argument for its reimbursement from public funds. State campaign reimbursement is a disguised form of party subsidy with particularly distortionary effects: it rewards parties for spending more, and creates an incentive to maximize campaign expenditure. Replacing private with public campaign financing suppresses the price signal that would otherwise discipline political actors’ spending decisions.
• Transition mechanism: Abolish campaign cost reimbursement. Parties fund their campaigns from voluntary contributions, subject to existing legal donation limits. This is directly consistent with the abolition of direct party subsidies (Cím 8) and should be implemented simultaneously.
• Affected groups: All parties that contested the 2026 election. Administrative simplification (the KH and the election office will no longer need to verify and process reimbursement claims).

Cím 11/1: Közszolgálati Hozzájárulás — Public Media Contribution (via Közszolgálati Médiaszolgáltatás Támogatása)

• Current allocation: 141,268.4 millió Ft
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: This is the single largest line item in Chapter I and the dominant driver of the chapter’s net deficit. The közszolgálati hozzájárulás (public service contribution) is the state subsidy to Hungary’s public media system — MTVA (Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund), which operates the public broadcaster entities (M1, M2, Duna TV, Kossuth Rádió, Petőfi Rádió, etc.). State-owned media financed by mandatory taxation represents a fundamental intrusion into the marketplace of ideas. The Austrian objection is both economic and principled: (1) There is no market failure justifying state provision of media — private media markets, including voluntary subscription, advertising, and pay-per-view models, can supply all categories of content; (2) State media inevitably becomes a political tool, suppressing rather than enriching public discourse; (3) 141 billion forint represents a massive transfer from all taxpayers to the programming preferences of the state, crowding out private media that must compete against a zero-marginal-cost competitor. The seen beneficiary is the public media audience; the unseen cost is the entire independent media ecosystem that cannot develop in the shadow of a state-subsidised competitor.
• Transition mechanism: This is classified Immediate Cut on principle, but practical transition requires a structured approach. Year 1 (2026, current): Announce termination of state subsidy effective end of 2027. Begin licensing MTVA assets (broadcast frequencies, production facilities, archives) for sale or lease to private operators. Year 2 (2027): Reduce contribution to zero; all public media entities must become commercially self-sustaining, converted to private ownership, or dissolved. Broadcast spectrum to be auctioned competitively. Public archives (historical footage, etc.) to be transferred to the National Archives under an open-access mandate.
• Affected groups: MTVA and its subsidiary broadcasters (est. 3,000-5,000 employees). Audiences of public channels (who retain access to commercially operated successors or competing private channels). Advertising market (benefits from reduced unfair state competition). Independent media (benefits from removal of state competitor).

Cím 21: Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság — NAIH (National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information)

• Current allocation: 2,414.5 millió Ft (Személyi juttatások 1,792.2 + Járulékok 237.9 + Dologi kiadások 384.4)
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: The NAIH enforces data protection law (implementing the EU GDPR) and handles freedom of information complaints. Data protection — specifically the right of individuals against unauthorized collection and use of their personal data — is defensible within a property-rights framework as an extension of individual sovereignty over personal information. The EU GDPR creates an external compliance obligation that Hungary cannot unilaterally exit. A nominal freeze prevents further expansion of what is already a well-staffed agency, while acknowledging that its core function has legitimacy. The Austrian concern is that regulatory expansion of data protection has moved well beyond private rights protection into regulation of voluntary business practices; that mission creep should be constrained.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation. Conduct a functional audit to identify and separate the genuinely rights-protective complaints-handling function from the purely regulatory inspection function. Over time, explore whether the rights-based complaint function could be integrated into the court system (where it belongs, as a form of tort adjudication) rather than a standing regulatory authority.
• Affected groups: NAIH staff. Data subjects making complaints. Businesses subject to GDPR enforcement actions.

Cím 23: Magyar Energetikai és Közmű-szabályozási Hivatal — MEKH (Hungarian Energy and Utility Regulatory Authority)

• Current allocation: 12,917.0 millió Ft (operating: 12,783.6; capital: 133.4); own revenue: 12,917.0 millió Ft
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: MEKH regulates Hungary’s energy sector (electricity, gas, district heating) and utility markets (water, waste). Its budget is essentially self-funding: own revenue of 12,917.0 millió Ft covers the entire operating cost, resulting in near-zero net draw on the central budget. The Austrian objection to utility regulation is well-known: energy market regulation — setting tariffs, mandating access conditions, controlling prices — distorts capital allocation and prevents the price signal from coordinating supply and demand. However, this distortion is already embedded in the legal structure; MEKH’s reform is contingent on broader energy market liberalization, which is a policy question beyond a single budget chapter. A nominal freeze limits further growth while the deeper policy question is addressed separately.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation. Initiate a parallel policy review of energy market liberalization: to the extent regulated tariff-setting is replaced by competitive market pricing, MEKH’s remit (and budget) can be reduced accordingly. In the medium term, transition the funding model fully to industry levies so the authority imposes zero net cost on the general budget.
• Affected groups: MEKH staff. Energy utilities subject to regulation. Residential and commercial energy consumers.

Cím 24: Nemzeti Választási Iroda — NVI (National Electoral Office)

• Current allocation: 33,122.8 millió Ft (operating: 32,772.8; capital: 350.0)
  • Core NVI operations: Személyi juttatások 1,134.6 + Járulékok 151.7 + Dologi kiadások 435.0 + Egyéb 4.0 + Beruházások 50.0 = 1,775.3
  • By-elections and minority elections (Időközi és nemzetiségi választások): 910.9
  • Election system maintenance (választási rendszerek működtetése): 7,498.6 (op 7,198.6 + cap 300.0)
  • 2026 parliamentary election administration: 22,938.0
• Classification: Keep (core operations and election administration); Nominal Freeze (election system maintenance)
• Rationale: The administration of elections is a core function of any constitutional order, including the minimal night-watchman state. The right to vote requires infrastructure: voter rolls, polling stations, ballot printing, and tabulation. The NVI’s core institutional budget of 1,775.3 millió Ft is reasonable. The 2026 election costs (22,938.0 millió Ft) are a one-time expenditure specific to this budget year and are not recurrent. The election system maintenance budget (7,498.6 millió Ft) is significant and warrants a nominal freeze to prevent scope creep. The by-election allocation (910.9 millió Ft) is reasonable as a standing reserve.
• Transition mechanism: Core NVI operations: Keep as is. 2026 election: One-time non-recurring item. Election system maintenance: Freeze at 2026 level; require itemized reporting on each component system. Explore whether some election-system IT functions could be competitively tendered rather than maintained by the NVI directly.
• Affected groups: NVI staff. All Hungarian voters (the integrity and administration of elections is a direct public good in the night-watchman framework).

Cím 25: Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottságának Hivatala — NEB (Office of the Committee on National Memory)

• Current allocation: 1,595.1 millió Ft (operating: 1,554.1; capital: 41.0)
• Classification: Immediate Cut
• Rationale: The NEB is mandated to preserve and disseminate official state memory of communist-era atrocities. While acknowledging the historical significance of this period, the production and propagation of official state historical narratives is not a legitimate state function in the Austrian framework. History — including difficult political history — is best understood through the free scholarship of independent historians, universities, and civil society institutions. The NEB as a state body tends to produce a particular politically sanctioned narrative rather than open scholarly inquiry. Its research functions partially duplicate those of universities and the ÁBTL. Its public outreach function is indistinguishable from state ideological promotion.
• Transition mechanism: Do not renew the institutional mandate. Transfer any archival custody functions to Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár. Academic research grants in this area can be provided through the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia) on a competitive, peer-reviewed basis. Close the NEB in a single budget cycle.
• Affected groups: NEB staff (est. 80-120 employees). Researchers affiliated with the NEB. Schools and educational institutions using NEB-produced materials (must source alternatives from independent scholarship).

Cím 26: Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatósága — SZTFH (Authority for Regulated Activities)

• Current allocation: 14,327.2 millió Ft (operating: 14,299.6; capital: 27.6); own revenue: 6,254.0
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: The SZTFH is an omnibus regulatory authority supervising a wide range of activities including anti-money-laundering compliance, insolvency administration, court enforcement officers, geothermal energy licensing, pressure vessel inspection, and investment gold trading. Many of these functions involve genuine property-rights protection (court enforcement, insolvency administration) or safety oversight (pressure vessels). The authority generates substantial own revenue (6,254.0 millió Ft) from regulated entities, though this still leaves a 8,073.2 millió Ft net draw. The breadth of its mandate — combining disparate regulated activities — reflects administrative consolidation rather than a coherent regulatory philosophy. A nominal freeze is appropriate; a functional review should identify which SZTFH activities can be devolved to sector-specific bodies, privatized (e.g., insolvency and enforcement officers can be self-regulating professional bodies funded by fees), or eliminated.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation. Commission a functional audit distinguishing: (a) genuine property-rights-protective functions (keep/transfer to courts); (b) technical safety oversight (keep, but fund fully from regulated industry fees); (c) anti-money-laundering compliance (EU-mandated, keep but resist scope creep). Transition full cost recovery from industry fees over 3 years, targeting zero net central budget draw.
• Affected groups: SZTFH staff (~500-700 estimated from salary mass). Regulated industries and professionals subject to SZTFH oversight. Creditors and debtors in insolvency proceedings.

Cím 27: Országos Atomenergia Hivatal — OAH (Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority)

• Current allocation: 7,474.3 millió Ft (operating: 7,352.1; capital: 122.2); own revenue: 3,180.3
• Classification: Nominal Freeze
• Rationale: The OAH is Hungary’s nuclear safety regulator, responsible for licensing, inspection, and enforcement at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear installations. Nuclear safety regulation is one of the strongest cases for a regulatory authority even within a market-oriented framework: the potential externalities (radioactive contamination) are severe, irreversible, and do not respect property boundaries, making them a genuine exception to the general presumption against regulation. The OAH partially self-funds through regulated entity fees (3,180.3 millió Ft), covering approximately 43% of costs. Given Hungary’s commitment to the Paks II nuclear expansion project, the OAH’s workload will increase significantly in coming years, making further spending growth likely. A nominal freeze is a floor, not a ceiling; any expansion must be justified against specific new regulatory obligations and should be funded entirely by fees on the nuclear industry.
• Transition mechanism: Freeze nominal allocation at 2026 level. Any new expenditures associated with Paks II licensing must be funded by dedicated fees charged to MVM Paks II Zrt. (the project company), not general budget appropriations. Target full cost recovery from nuclear industry fees within 5 years.
• Affected groups: OAH staff. MVM Paks and MVM Paks II (fee-payers). The broader Hungarian public as beneficiaries of nuclear safety oversight.

---

Revenue Items

Operating Revenue: Országgyűlés Hivatali Szervei (Assembly Administrative Bodies)

• Name: Működési bevétel — Országgyűlés hivatali szervei (Operating Revenue — Assembly Administrative Bodies)
• Current yield: 2,510.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / Charge
• Notes: Miscellaneous own-revenue of the Assembly administration (rental of premises, publications, etc.). Would be partially affected by any reduction in the administrative apparatus.

Operating Revenue: Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára — ÁBTL

• Name: Működési bevétel — ÁBTL (Own Revenue — Historical Archive)
• Current yield: 5.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee
• Notes: Negligible fee income from archival access and publications. Would disappear upon institutional closure under the phase-out scenario.

Operating Revenue: Közbeszerzési Hatóság — KH (Public Procurement Authority)

• Name: Működési bevétel — KH (Own Revenue — Procurement Authority)
• Current yield: 2,194.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / Charge
• Notes: Fees charged to contracting authorities and businesses for procurement procedures, dispute resolution, and supervision. Covers approximately 61% of the KH’s operating expenditure. Under a shrinking state, procurement volumes will decline, reducing fee income proportionally.

Operating Revenue: Magyar Energetikai és Közmű-szabályozási Hivatal — MEKH

• Name: Működési bevétel — MEKH (Own Revenue — Energy Regulator)
• Current yield: 12,917.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / Charge (industry levy)
• Notes: Levies and fees charged to energy utilities and utility operators subject to MEKH regulation. Effectively self-funding at 2026 allocation levels. These fees are ultimately borne by energy consumers through regulated tariff structures. From an Austrian perspective, industry levies on regulated firms are less distortionary than general taxation but still represent a form of compulsory extraction when the underlying regulation itself is of dubious merit.

Operating Revenue: Szabályozott Tevékenységek Felügyeleti Hatósága — SZTFH

• Name: Működési bevétel — SZTFH (Own Revenue — Authority for Regulated Activities)
• Current yield: 6,254.0 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / Charge (regulatory levies)
• Notes: Fees from supervised industries: insolvency administrators, court enforcement officers, geothermal license applicants, pressure vessel operators, etc. Covers approximately 44% of operating costs. Revenue would contract if SZTFH’s mandate is narrowed (particularly if insolvency administration is privatized as a self-regulating professional body).

Capital Revenue: Nemzeti Választási Iroda — Election System Maintenance

• Name: Felhalmozási bevétel — választási rendszerek működtetése (Capital Revenue — Election System Maintenance)
• Current yield: 300.0 millió Ft
• Type: Other (possibly EU co-financing or asset disposal)
• Notes: Small capital revenue associated with election system infrastructure projects.

Operating Revenue: Országos Atomenergia Hivatal — OAH

• Name: Működési bevétel — OAH (Own Revenue — Atomic Energy Authority)
• Current yield: 3,180.3 millió Ft
• Type: Fee / Charge (nuclear industry levy)
• Notes: Fees charged to nuclear plant operators. Covers approximately 43% of OAH costs. Under the recommended transition, this should rise to 100% of costs, eliminating the net general budget draw.

---

Chapter Summary

Classification	Count	Total (millió Ft)
Immediate Cut	7	153,206.6
Phase-Out	2	23,516.6
Nominal Freeze	7	148,441.7
Keep	1	23,027.4
Total	17	348,192.3

Note: Classification totals are estimated from institution-level aggregations. Party financing (Cím 8 + 9 + 10) totals 9,779.2 millió Ft as Immediate Cut. Public media (Cím 11) at 141,268.4 millió Ft is the dominant Immediate Cut. The one-time 2026 election costs (22,938.0 millió Ft within Cím 24) are included in the Keep total as a non-recurrent item.

Revenue	Total (millió Ft)
Total chapter own revenue (operating)	27,060.3
of which: MEKH industry levies	12,917.0
of which: SZTFH regulatory fees	6,254.0
of which: OAH nuclear levies	3,180.3
of which: KH procurement fees	2,194.0
of which: Assembly administrative revenue	2,510.0
of which: Other (NVI capital, ÁBTL)	5.0

---

Key Observations

• The single largest expenditure — 141,268.4 millió Ft for public media — accounts for 40.6% of the chapter’s total spending and is almost entirely a subsidy for state-controlled broadcasting. Its elimination would produce the largest fiscal saving of any single item across the chapter and would remove the state’s dominant position in the media market.
• Political party and foundation financing (Cím 8, 9, 10 combined: 9,779.2 millió Ft) is constitutionally and economically indefensible and should be abolished simultaneously with campaign cost reimbursement. The distribution is heavily skewed toward the governing party and its foundation.
• Three major regulatory bodies — MEKH, SZTFH, and OAH — collectively generate 22,351.3 millió Ft in own revenue against total costs of 34,719.3 millió Ft, suggesting a path to full cost recovery from regulated industries within 3-5 years and zero net general budget draw.
• The Steindl Imre Program (21,369.5 millió Ft) continues a long-running prestige renovation project around Parliament. The capital component (16,589.3 millió Ft) is the fourth largest capital expenditure in the chapter and exceeds the operating budgets of all regulatory agencies combined. Much of this spending serves aesthetic rather than structural purposes.
• Former presidents receive a combined 219.0 millió Ft in discretionary charitable funds — a small but symbolically important example of discretionary public spending without rule-based allocation or accountability.
• The ÁBTL (2,147.8 millió Ft) and NEB (1,595.1 millió Ft) are parallel institutions with overlapping historical research and archival mandates that could be consolidated into the Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár at substantially lower cost.
• The 2026 parliamentary election costs (22,938.0 millió Ft within Cím 24) are a legitimate one-time expense; care must be taken not to extrapolate this figure as a baseline for future budget years. In non-election years, the NVI’s budget should revert to its core institutional level of approximately 2,500-3,000 millió Ft.
• Own revenues across the chapter (27,060.3 millió Ft) cover only 7.8% of total expenditure, leaving a substantial net claim on the central budget of 321,132.0 millió Ft. Regulatory bodies moving toward full fee-based funding would incrementally reduce this deficit.